USAWC CIVILAIN RESEARCH PROJECT

(how best to organize and optimize the analytical effort within the us intelligence community)

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“Neither a wise man nor a brave man lies on the tracks of history to wait for the train of the future to run over him”

Dwight Eisenhower

**Introduction**

While acknowledging progress made on several fronts within the US Intelligence Community (USIC), this paper presents a series of recommendations on how best to organize and optimize the intelligence analysis effort to ensure the USIC remains competitive and relevant for years to come. Accelerated and pervasive technology changes, its effects on organizations and people, and the necessity to adapt and adopt new ways given this new technology landscape demand nothing short of a cultural transformation within the USIC. It is a transformation many private sector businesses have already undertaken, but one the USIC has not started due to cultural and policy barriers.

The new technology landscape, which is characterized by an unprecedented use of mobile devices, on demand Internet computing, the convergence of communications, content, communities, and collaboration, as well as an increased emphasis of semantic integration of data to better support decision-making, has shifted knowledge creation power from institutions to groups and individuals, forcing organizations to move toward greater decentralization. Successful institutions have adapted to this new environment by constantly seeking a “mercurial sweet spot” along the centralized-decentralized organizational continuum.[[1]](#endnote-1) Unfortunately, the Intelligence Community’s proclivity toward greater centralization in spite of decentralizing technology advances prevents us from fully realizing our analytical network potential. Some may argue the USIC’s organizational tendency is strictly determined by statutory requirements; I argue that all too often the IC culture justifies outdated practices on a convenient read of such requirements or on requirements that need changing. Our ability to provide decision-makers with consistent superior and comprehensive intelligence analytical support anytime, anywhere over the long term is predicated on how well we overcome cultural and policy barriers and capitalize on the emerging technology landscape today, which demands a more decentralized approach.

In this new environment, people and their use of technology are the competitive differentiators. We must do everything possible to ensure our organizational construct sharpens this relationship. We need to embed the necessary technology tools, implement bold policies, and advance transformational cultural change so that institutional and individual behaviors change and collaboration becomes embedded in intelligence analysis processes.[[2]](#endnote-2) The proposal is daunting given the scope and required DNA change, but it is also necessary if we are to remain competitive and relevant in our field.

The recommendations I make are based on best practices from corporate America, more specifically, from the opportunity to serve with Accenture for one year as part of the Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellows Program and visits with eight other top companies participating in the program. I complement my observations from the private sector with an extensive literature review as well as years of tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence experience.

**About Accenture**

Since I will be drawing significantly upon knowledge gained from my tenure with Accenture, a few words about this company are in order. Accenture is a global consulting firm with a rich history rooted on sound corporate values, and marked by innovation, dexterity, and vision to bring clients and self to the next level of high performance. Their success in lowering costs and minimizing losses in revenues during the most recent global economic downturn as well as their strategy to come out stronger in 2010 is a testament to their thriving business model as recognized by forecasts from industry experts.[[3]](#endnote-3)

Though Accenture’s history with and as part of Andersen Consulting and Arthur Andersen dates back to over 50 years, it was not until the turn of the millennium when Accenture became fully independent, adopting its new name, an abbreviation for Accent on the Future, on January 1, 2001. Time and again, Accenture has re-invented itself to capitalize on an ever changing business environment. It is constantly improving its business model and as a result become an industry leader on management consulting, information systems integration, and business processes outsourcing. Using a matrix approach, Accenture combines seasoned industry professionals with functional thought leaders and skilled technical experts to enable high performance across all major industries around the world.[[4]](#endnote-4)

Accenture has grown from a ten billion dollar organization at the turn of millennium to an organization of over 21.5 billion dollars in 2009, with presence in over 52 countries, and a workforce of over 177,000. Their customers include 96 of the Fortune Global 100 corporations, more than three-quarters of Fortune Global 500 corporations as well as major government agencies around the world.[[5]](#endnote-5) Accenture has not only been on the leading edge of management consulting, systems integration, and business processes outsourcing, but as its Chairman and CEO Bill Green highlights “Accenture is so far ahead of its competitors that it is gone and working on the next innovation by the time others have gotten to its place.”[[6]](#endnote-6) Their core values and emphasis on innovation, relevancy, and nimbleness provide the foundation for their successful enterprise.

Client value creation, one-global network, respect for the individual, best people, integrity, and stewardship are Accenture’s core values. As an independent observer, one can readily tell these values are operationally evident within the organization and at the clients’ sites. From their top executive to the analyst, the corporation’s emphasis is on client value creation and taking actions as good stewards to leave the company in a better state than they found it. They share a common ideology and are genuinely passionate about their clients’ clients and the implementation of win-win solutions. Mostly recruited from prestigious colleges and raised in the Accenture’s culture, Accenture’s people exude optimism, professional tone, and tenacity. With a training investment of over $900 million in 2009, Accenture ensures its workforce is highly competent and is focused on knowledge creation through collaboration.[[7]](#endnote-7) Openness and honesty toward clients and the workforce are essential to the Accenture’s formula for retaining clients and the workforce. The corporation’s leveraging of new technologies and tech-savvy workforce is quite impressive. Its applicability to the USIC is evident. Potential gains for the intelligence analysis effort within the USIC could be revolutionary.

**Accenture and the Department of Defense**

Accenture and the Department of Defense developed have sustained a mutually beneficial relationship since the very origins of the company in 1953. Quickly recognizing the importance of computer science advances the military had made in partnership with academia, Accenture sought to apply such technological advances to the corporate world. Accenture’s modification and application of post-WWII computer technology to the payrolls of General Electric started an information systems revolution that now permeates every aspect of the global economy and our way of life. As one of Accenture’s largest and most important clients, DoD has also benefited from the information technology and outsourcing solutions, which Accenture has developed for it repeatedly. This win-win relationship has allowed each other to capitalize on their respective organizations innovations. Lessons learned from one sector are often transferable in some modified form to the other. In this paper, I focus primarily on the business practices that Accenture has adopted to thrive in the new technology landscape and that I believe would serve the DoD and the USIC well.

Accenture’s ability to leverage their decentralized global network of personnel through a centralized information technology platform and common operational processes allows the corporation to tackle every project with their foremost experts and optimize finite resources. Just as remarkable is its ability to lead and manage change internally as well as help its clients to do the same within their respective work environments. Change and constant leveraging of its one global network is in Accenture’s DNA and culture; a culture consistently delivering high performance to their clients, focusing on relevancy of their business model, speed to value, and as demonstrated by their 50-year plus history, a capacity for rising above economic downturns. In my estimation, the Department of Defense and more specifically, the analytical effort within the USIC would benefit greatly from adopting best business practices associated primarily with Accenture’s core value of the one-global network.

Trends defining the new global technology landscape

Accelerated technology advances are quickly outpacing the Intelligence Community’s policies and more importantly, its culture. Changes in the global operating environment require a shift along the organizational continuum and a profound cultural transformation. In this section and using Accenture’s assessment on emerging global technologies as a baseline, I will describe trends defining the technology landscape while simultaneously addressing effects these trends have on adversaries and the USIC. The USIC’s ability to understand emerging trends as well as the capacity to posture itself in a way that allows us to capitalize on such trends is essential to its mission, and ultimately, to the security of the United States.

We all know technology is ever changing and that it has had a profound effect in the development of human civilization. What is different now is the pace of technology change, its level of market penetration, and the effects accelerated technology changes have in our daily lives. According to Accenture Chief Scientist, K.S. Swaminathan, four major interrelated trends are defining the technology landscape: Internet computing;data and decisions; *m(obile)* as the new *e* for social or business interaction; and the convergence of communication, collaboration, communities, and content.[[8]](#endnote-8)

Internet Computing. Though Internet computing is an evolving trend with its full definition yet to be developed, some essential characteristics can be used to better understand its potential benefits and challenges. The first characteristic is that Internet computing enables on-demand self-service. It allows convenient on-demand access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g. networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction. Secondly, Internet computing provides broad network access. Capabilities are available over the network and accessed through either thin or thick clients such as PDAs, mobile phones, and laptops. Resource pooling is the third essential characteristic. It is the ability of a resource provider to serve multiple consumers using a multi-tenant model, with different physical and virtual resources dynamically assigned and reassigned according to consumer demand. Finally, a fourth essential component to Internet computing is its rapid elasticity. Customers can scale out or in at will. To them the options seem unlimited and they can be purchased in any quantity at any time. Flexibility offered by Internet computing is remarkable, more so when one could limit the deployment of these services to either a private or a community-wide network, or could even deploy them to the more public Internet venue.[[9]](#endnote-9)

The benefits of Internet computing are gigantic in both efficiencies and cost savings, not to mention incentives for much higher productivity. Internet computing promotes economies of scale, lowers entry barriers to competition, provides for greater sourcing options, offers best of breed options, and ultimately sets technology conditions for high institutional and individual performance.[[10]](#endnote-10) It is about attaining greater efficiencies to reduce production costs, achieving greater elasticity, and accelerating speed to market, to include the market of ideas. As part of Internet computing, cloud computing and other evolving technologies will increasingly provide institutions and people ready access to pay as you go business solutions residing on the Internet. It makes what used to be impossibly unaffordable affordable, not only to large institutions, but to small businesses and individuals as well. Internet computing and other technology trends are acting as an equalizer, shifting enormous power from institutions to people.

Internet computing and the ability to source information technology whether hardware or software on a pay as you go basis is one of the key factors leveling the global knowledge creation playing field and shifting the organizational and operational paradigm. In the past, prohibitive capital expenses limited knowledge creation from small businesses and individuals. The competitive advantage was on the side of large and centralized organizations able to afford and deliberately implement complex technology solutions. Now Internet computing offers adversaries, even at the individual level, an affordable research and development mechanism. It gives them an asymmetric tool to achieve disproportionate technological results.

In his work, K.S. Swaminathan offers a dramatic example where research and development costs were reduced from what would have otherwise been an intensive upfront capital investment of millions of dollars to a lease of about one hundred dollars an hour, and a total project cost of approximately one hundred thousand dollars. In this environment, one can afford to be riskier as the upfront commitment is exponentially lower and project progression routinely scalable. This new paradigm erodes our traditional competitive advantage of achieving the greatest and latest technology advances through large capital investments. As Swaminathan points out, anyone who has a complex computing need today can rent a “super computer” for a few hours through the Internet from any part of the globe for a fraction of the capital investment.

In theory, the U.S. government appears to understand the importance and potential implications of Internet computing, but in practice and policies, the IC culture prevents it from fully capitalizing on this tremendous resource. In its fiscal year 2010 budget, the U.S. Government acknowledges the importance of Internet computing and calls for optimizing common services and solutions. It specifically calls for implementation of pilot projects to identify enterprise-wide common services and solutions, with a new emphasis on cloud-computing.[[11]](#endnote-11) Though somewhat comforting to know the U.S. government recognizes importance of this trend, its approach shies away from a cultural transformation and is likely to be stalled or slowed down significantly by a bureaucracy that often sees inter-departmental solutions as an organizational threat and that is inherently reluctant to change. A focus on compartmentalization and stringent application of the need to know policy exacerbates the challenge within the USIC.

One of the projects I have been exposed to while at Accenture focuses on gaining a better understanding of the government and military health systems to formulate high performance solutions. After following the issue for several months, I have noticed significant similarities between it and the analysis effort within the USIC. Both systems are in need of a cultural overhaul to overcome present ineffective and inefficient practices in dealing with new technologies. Systems complexity is another similarity; both missions are sizable in scope and surpass knowledge any one person may have. Further, in both cases, high performance solutions require system-wide collaboration. Within each system, leadership and technology experts have an understanding albeit fractionalized of emerging technologies and their effects, even of the need for transformational changes. However, in both projects, “cultures have consistently eaten transformational change initiatives for lunch.” The transitional nature of leadership within both systems has not helped in achieving needed long-term changes.

Data & decisions. The second trend shaping the technology landscape concerns data and decisions. There are four incremental data stages: data capture; data sharing & transparency; semantic integration; and predictive action. These stages are essential to the most fundamental intelligence function, which is to provide accurate and timely analysis in support of military decisions and policy-making. Accurate and timely strategic and operational intelligence resides within the predictive action realm. Though some USIC databases have reached the predictive action stage, most reside in the lower stages. As in other trends, USIC rhetoric concerning collaboration greatly differs from cultural practices. Community rhetoric calls for community-wide fused databases capable of providing timely and accurate predictive analysis. Actual practices reflect a cultural emphasis on compartmentalization and need to know, with progress often limited to read only type data transparency. The USIC is far from providing decision-makers with consistent institutional and comprehensive predictive analysis. Most of the experiences where the USIC has been able to provide community-wide operational predictive analysis have resulted from personal, not institutional solutions. Current delivery of intelligence does not quite meet customer’s demand. Customers have a need for community-wide assessments, with stronger analytics that go beyond static scorecards and briefs frequently based on partial data sets. Customers demand a comprehensive and fluid effort that helps them respond in this new environment at speed.

The operational and strategic intelligence support to the Multi-National Forces – Iraq in 2007 illustrates how superior leadership managed to provide needed support in spite of cultural barriers, but it also illustrates how far we are from institutional solutions. In this instance, combatant command and national level analysts managed to provide predictive intelligence in a reasonably comprehensive and consistent manner. Reasonably comprehensive because defense and non-defense national intelligence is not systematically fused at the operational level, and a great deal of the intelligence analysis flows through institutional silos. Iraq violence activity database(s) is a case in point. In 2007, there were at least three databases with different data capturing methods, various degrees of transparency, and different semantic protocols, threatening the accuracy and timeliness of analytical forecasts. I experienced similar community-wide issues regarding intelligence support to Afghanistan during my tenure as the operations officer for the CENTCOM Joint Intelligence Center in 2009.

Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) offer a glimpse of the powerful capability developed when data are transparent, shared, and integrated to produce community-wide analytical forecasts. However, even the JIATFs databases tend to be partially integrated. JIATFs members are sometimes liaisons, sometimes analysts, with various degrees of authority to reach back to their organizations for support. The contributions representatives make to the JIATFs regarding data are bound by the policies and cultures of their respective organizations and frequently result in the sharing and integration of a fraction of the data residing at home station. Data segments from the different organizations are collated at the JIATFs and integrated in local databases that are normally bound by strict caveats, with heavy emphasis on need to know. Data are then, even in the best of circumstances, partially integrated and only at a specific location, for a specific purpose, limiting the benefits a community wide approach could bring. JIATFs often become islands of knowledge that is derived from data imports, but little of the data are exported to feed the community analytical cycle. In a world where tactical actions consistently have strategic implications and vice versa, the segmentation of data affects negatively all levels of intelligence analysis.

Personally, I have had the privilege of working in joint and interagency environments for most of my military career. In those environments, I have seen the value generated from fusing data, but unfortunately, I have also experienced the inefficiencies and counter-productive nature of segregated data efforts. All too often databases are redundant homegrown efforts presenting incomplete, costly, and ineffective solutions. The reason for this parochialism is that databases justify budgets and as such, they are jealously guarded in a power struggle that hurts the overall analytical effort. Whether forward-deployed or supporting military operations from home base, organizations tend to adapt and adopt their own solutions as in every case they claim to know better than predecessors or other community members what is required. Collaboration is selective, not comprehensive. Information derived from databases is safeguarded from other community members through practices and technology. Hubris fostered by budgetary abundance and all too often obscured by needs for security and exclusiveness trumps much richer and accurate analysis opportunities that could be reached through full and transparent interagency collaboration. Just as with Internet computing, data & decisions require community wide solutions.

One of the areas, which require much greater fusion of data, is human terrain analysis. Given changes in the global and operational landscape, human terrain analysis has become critical. Unfortunately, as in other key intelligence issues, data on human terrain reside in multiple and incompatible databases. There are cases were mechanisms for data capturing on human terrain are not even established. While key operational and strategic key players claim to be creating one-stop shops in this area, we continue to have multiple home grown solutions with little interaction, even less fusion, and limited applicability.

*M(obile)* becoming the new *e.* Mobility achieved through electronic means is revolutionizing the way we interact with our environment and others. “The most significant change in mobility is not the new interface to the phone; it is the phone becoming the interface to everything else.”[[12]](#endnote-12) The speed of change brought along by advances on telecommunications and the depth of penetration, especially in emerging economies is simply astounding. Driving forces behind the emerging mobile computing platform include advanced device capabilities, consolidation of platforms, wireless bandwidth growth, and booming applications marketplace.[[13]](#endnote-13)

Mobile phones are becoming the preferred interface to the world. It gives people the world over the capacity to socialize and innovate at an unprecedented pace and exponentially larger scale. Already usage of mobile phone far exceeds that of computers due to versatility and cost, and given the current trajectory mobile phones, it will become ubiquitous in the not so distant future. In developing countries where resources are at a premium, mobile phones offer at a fraction of the cost the features of a computer, camera, game console, and even of payment and shopping services amongst others. This is the reason why the lower-middle class comprises the highest demand for the popular I-Phone.

Mobility is changing individual and organizational behavior. People are blending work and life continually. For Accenture personnel, their computers and mobile phones have become their offices, keeping company capital holdings to a minimum and maximizing workforce productivity time as well as flexibility. This practice is consistent with observations made at other companies participating in the Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellows Program. This trend presents significant challenges and opportunities for the USIC.

Over the past year with Accenture, I have experienced firsthand the benefits of a mobile environment. I can attest to a substantial increase in productivity level due to the accessibility and flexibility of mobility. One is always connected, whether at the office, business travel, or at home. There is always a right time, place, and mobile venue for knowledge creation and collaboration. In contrast, the military intelligence analysis field limits most of the knowledge creation and collaboration to the office environment, failing to capitalize fully on an extraordinary number of potential production hours during business travels. Whether in corporate America or in the USIC, security is a top concern, but as in corporate America, it should not be the only deciding factor. One can take advantage of mobility through adequate risk management and appropriate security measures. Technology is available to mitigate security risks. Mobility could ultimately provide intelligence community analysts with the capacity to reach and provide intelligence anytime, anywhere, a paramount intelligence principle. I offer a couple of concrete examples of how to mitigate security concerns in the recommendations section.

Convergence of communication, collaboration, communities, and content. We are in the midst of an information paradigm shift with extraordinary implications for the intelligence community. Information sharing globally is quickly moving from the traditional need to know mentality to a good to know environment. Need to know correlates to centralized organizations information management where knowledge is power, normally transferred via a top-down dynamic, and heavily safeguarded. In the rapidly growing good to know environment our peripheral awareness is widen and information handled in a much more different manner than the traditional need to know paradigm. Knowledge is still powerful and the engine of innovation, but employed through a bottom up approach, in a distributed way, and created through extensive collaboration. Think of the explosion of social networks on the Internet and their operating premise where it is good to know, though not necessary, what your network of family and friends are up to. In this space, there are countless communities of interest creating and sharing knowledge, with an increasing emphasis on the how-to videos such as YouTube. There are countless challenges and opportunities in this area as not only our newcomers thrive in this environment, but potential and existing threats do as well.

**Overarching global technology landscape effects on human capital and organizations**

The way and scope in which knowledge is created in this new environment is vastly different from previous generations. The convergence of communication, collaboration, communities, and content, and the resulting distributed knowledge is eroding the competitive edge large organizations sustained historically, and increasingly empowering individuals and communities. Organizations recognizing the technology landscape changes and its importance are swiftly adapting and adopting ways that emphasize the impetus on individual and group knowledge creation and interaction. All companies participating in the SECDEF Corporate Fellows Program are deploying various social networks, Internet computing, data & decisions, and mobility projects to benefit from new opportunities. They are also using the latest technology and human capital practices to minimize risk and increase security. Likewise, we should overcome cultural impediments and posture ourselves in the USIC to benefit from this new paradigm and remain competitive.

Effects on human capital. Human capital is our most precious intelligence analysis asset and yet our policies and practices do not necessarily reflect so. The emphasis in recruiting is on retention of former military or civilians already in the system, development and training of civilian personnel is often set aside from other mission or personal imperatives, and retention does not always correlate with high performance. The current approach is not conducive to the recruitment, development, and retention of a workforce that is highly proficient on subject matter knowledge and knowledge creation tools. The emerging environment in which the millennial generation thrives on demands a different set of rules to recruit, develop, and retain high performers with the right behavioral skills for innovation through collaboration. A higher emphasis on quality and potential is needed. An understanding of the millennial generation, also known as Generation Y or Net Generation, is crucial to formulate successful recruitment, development, and retention strategies.

This generation is different from previous generations. We need to understand their value system to develop productive work environments. Generation Y values freedom of choice to include where they work, how they work, and when they work. They seek customized information and employment relationships. They are scrutinizers, highly engaged online with an expectation of transparency. Net Generation creates knowledge and solves problems through collaboration, expecting to contribute to thought leadership immediately. They certainly have a different view of authority in the workplace. To them, workplaces must be fun, learning must be entertaining – learning, work, collaboration and entertainment are inseparable. Speed is in their DNA, Net-Geners are speeding up the metabolism of organizations. Finally, they expect open and honest information from employers as well as aligned values.[[14]](#endnote-14)

According to a survey conducted by National Public Radio in 2009, the Millennial Generation expectations are high. They expect the best technology, ability to download free software and content, as well as instant access and 24/7 service. They value leisure over work. Knowledge creation through collaboration is second nature to them. Generation Y sends over two thousand text messages a month, has more discretionary spending than baby boomers, and prefers texting over face-to-face. E-mail is archaic to many of them. Generation Y members are always “on”, always texting, and have an urge to respond immediately when texted. They prefer to work for companies with the latest and greatest technology, relaxed security policies, and access to a high degree of virtual social interaction, Generation Y members are inclined to share on a good to know basis and have disdain for restrictive information security policies, which present some unique challenges for the USIC. A balanced approach in this area is critical, especially if the USIC wants to recruit, develop, retain and ultimately benefit from the very best Gen Y has to offer.[[15]](#endnote-15)

Seventy million strong, Generation Y is almost three times the size of Generation X, and equal to the size of baby boomers. Their actions are already having a significant impact on political and socio-economic issues. This new generation, which is more affluent than any one before, focuses on social causes that transcend materialism. They are motivated by ideology and seek jobs that tend to help others. Though large, given the increased global business demand for tech savvy human capital, supply Generation Y talent is in short supply. The USIC is one of many that have to compete for this low density, high demand resource and as such, it would be smart for executives to check in on human resources and consider rewriting a few policies to prepare for and to capture the talent of Generation Y.[[16]](#endnote-16)

Effects on organizations. A key effect of the new global technology and operational landscape on existing organizations is the push toward greater decentralization, and with it a fundamental shift of innovative and analytical power from institutions to people, which presents a cultural challenge to our centralized and hierarchical intelligence community. In their book titled *The Starfish and the Spider: the Unstoppable Power of Leaderless Organizations,* Ori Brafman and Rod A. Beckstrom do an excellent job at describing emerging trends and explaining their impact on organizations.[[17]](#endnote-17) I use their organizational model to compare and contrast the USIC with other organizations and make a case for the need and urgency of a cultural transformation within the community. According to their book, organizations exist along a centralized-decentralized continuum. Using a spider as a metaphor for centralization and a starfish for decentralization, they argue that the best business strategy is to continuously seek and attain the “sweet spot,” a balancing act between centralized and decentralized organizations. They describe the sweet spot as being mercurial, ever changing, thus requiring an insatiable quest for the most effective and efficient construct along the organizational spectrum. Organizations able to lead or quickly adapt to the changing environment tend to be more successful than those with rigid business strategies or are slow to change.

In their use of the two analogies, the authors explain a spider as a creature that is centrally controlled, with its eight legs moving according to directions coming from the spider’s head. Without the head, the spider simply dies. According to them, spider-like organizations always have someone in charge, have headquarters, and as is the case with spiders, if you thump these organizations on the head, they die. Spider-like organizations have a clear division of roles. Knowledge and power are concentrated and the organization is rigid, with working groups communicating through intermediaries.

A starfish, on the other hand, resembles de-centralized organizations. It does not have a head. Its central body is not in charge and its major organs are replicated throughout each and every arm. Were you to cut an arm, another would develop. So unlike spiders, in a starfish-like organization no one is in charge, there are no headquarters, and if you thump it on the head, it survives. Knowledge and power are distributed, the organization is flexible, and one cannot count the participants. Working groups in a starfish-like organization communicate with each other directly.

Both Accenture and the USIC are primarily spider-like organizations with clearly someone in charge, units that are funded by the organization, and a recognizable number of participants. Similarities become less clear when addressing other features. Organizations such as EBay and Amazon are hybrids, while Al-Qaida offers a prime example of a decentralized organization. In the end, organizations are best served by finding the so called sweet spot between the spider and starfish alternatives.

When compared to the analysis effort within the USIC, it appears the mix Accenture has adopted is more suitable to differentiate themselves from other firms in the consulting business and to take advantage of the new global technology context. The USIC analysis effort has yet to reach the sweet spot to more effectively and efficiently address new technology challenges. More importantly its present culture does not allow to it make the necessary DNA changes to move us closer to its sweet spot. Even in the face of catastrophic events such as those of September 11, 2001, the IC has opted for timid consensus based incremental approaches that in some important regards pull us farther from rather than closer of the ideal organizational structure.

This is not to say, however, that DoD has been lethargic and not making progress adapting to the new and ever changing world environment. Much has been done, but radical and cultural changes are needed. As mentioned before the creation and emphasis on Joint Inter Agency Task Forces (JIATFs) is a step in the right direction. This initiative has forced much needed collaboration and has had the salutary effect of the people participating in them returning to their respective organizations with a different perspective and expectation regarding collaboration. JIATFs, however, can and often end up as a separate effort. They become islands furthering independence and redundancies, and often find themselves focusing on an administrative struggle to establish permanency vice accomplishing their temporary assigned mission. Though I have seen highly successful JIATF initiatives, I have too seen groupings of second class analysts and/or liaisons with unclear tasks and purpose and with the only cosmetic benefit of carrying the JIATF label. Change is needed at the core.

The failed 2009 Christmas Day terrorist attack on a United States-bound passenger airline carried out by a young Nigerian provides us with yet another example of the profound changes that are needed within the USIC. The attack, which was thwarted because the detonator strapped to the terrorist was faulty, could have killed the 279 passengers and 11 crew members aboard the flight. The fact that intelligence on this particular terrorist was available, but not transparent and shared is disheartening and very telling of the need for greater collaboration and much improved operational and strategic analysis within the USIC. Just as highlighted on the data and decisions section, the USIC must transcend information barriers and move toward a place where full interagency collaboration finally prevails. Our modus operandi that lets organizational hubris and outdated practices prevail over much needed collaborative and transparent environment does not bode well for the outcome of the fight against an amorphous and elusive adversary who understands and increasingly capitalizes on the emerging technology trends. Thus far catastrophic events and subsequent attempts have not been sufficient to cause the much needed cultural overhaul as we continue to centralize further, reacting to symptoms and not to true causes. The solutions are not found on additional enhanced defensive measures, but rely instead on forcing the interagency to open up databases within the USIC, collaborate on analysis, and provide timely and comprehensive forecasts.

**Recommended solutions**

Given the emerging global technology landscape and its effects on organizations and human capital, the following recommendations are offered to better organize and optimize the intelligence analysis effort within the USIC. As previously mentioned, this proposal does not call for the creation of yet additional bureaucracy and or organizational layers, but it does demand for a cultural transformation recognizing the existing resource constraints of existing resources. It would also require a bold vision and an aggressive, scalable implementation plan. Congressional approval with top military and civilian leadership commitment would be requisite given the scope of the recommendations and profound cultural transformation involved. Anything short of this ambitious, but achievable vision would likely continue the erosion of the USIC’s competitive technological and human capital advantage. The emerging technology trends shaping the global landscape present tremendous challenges and opportunities for the USIC, but it presents mostly opportunities if it swiftly postures itself to exploit the new environment.

Recommendation #1. Optimizing human capital. Nowadays organizations increasingly have access to the same innovation technology tools, thus the key differentiator has become human talent.[[18]](#endnote-18) It is crucial we understand and capitalize on the value systems of previous as well as the new workforce generations to keep our competitive edge. Understanding must be followed by the formulation and implementation of a bold vision that moves us closer to our human capital sweet spot and allows us to recruit, develop, and retain the very best.

Our human capital strategy ought to capitalize on the nomadic and expeditionary spirit of Generation Y. Their inclination for freedom of choice to include where they work, how they work, and when they work could be key ingredients to the emphasis we need to place on greater USIC collaboration and mobility. Their moves from one agency to another during their career progression could be an important step toward the breaking down on institutional silos and adopting a more collaborative culture. We should also capitalize on their expeditionary spirit, which is a key component of our military but is often viewed as a hindrance by many established analysts who do their utmost not to deploy, greatly limiting our analyst network capacity to provide comprehensive intelligence anytime, anywhere.

Career progression is no longer exclusively linked to the degree of technical competence and the new generation places a high value on long duration careers. Key values to the new generation include meritocracy, working on projects that matter, being heard by their superiors, receiving feedback, and having the ability to connect with others. Recognizing these values, the USIC’s human capital strategy should place greater emphasis on project-based assignments with a short tenure and greater exposure to the different organizations within the USIC. In this new environment, people and networking skills are equally important for career advancement.[[19]](#endnote-19)

Accenture assesses there is a looming war for human capital on the horizon which will affect private and non-private sectors. Understanding how the talent model runs today and what changes may be required to attract and retain the Net Generation is crucial. One change is an evaluation of IT security policies to determine ability to use new tools at work. Additionally, supervisors would need to manage by outcome versus line of sight and execute succession planning efforts where possible. Organizations also need to spend time upgrading the technical skills of the experienced workforce since they are remaining on the job. Lastly, supervisors must be open to organizing and executing work in unstructured or different ways, again with mobility being a key future workforce factor.[[20]](#endnote-20)

Just as important is that we identify the critical analytical positions and have a plan to fill these positions with the best and brightest analysts. DoD civilian recruitment should not continue to adopt the path of least resistance, which focuses recruitment efforts on the retention of former military personnel or limiting recruiting to those who are already working within the organization. If the USIC wants the most talented workforce, there is a need for a better balanced approach. Just as Accenture, the USIC needs an aggressive recruiting plan to hire recent graduates from the best colleges to infuse new thinking and greater collaborative affinity into the organization’s culture. There needs to be a better balance between incumbents and newcomers as well as between the quantity and quality of human capital. A long-term institutional commitment to developing the next group of military intelligence professionals through education and strong on-site mentorship programs are also necessary.

Ideology is the glue that brings together individuals and groups in the growing decentralized environment.[[21]](#endnote-21) There is no greater and more sublime value than the opportunity to serve and protect the nation. Our civilian human capital strategy needs to market this idea to the most promising Generation Y candidates. Ideas, however, need to be backed up by corresponding practices and technologies that appeal to the new workforce generation. Our practices throughout the entire cycle of recruitment, development, and retention need to exude excellence, excitement, and have a direct linkage to our ideology. Newcomers ought to have a sense of adventure, enthusiasm, thirst for knowledge, and as the new mobile environment requires it, a desire and a commitment to go where duty calls. The USIC needs civilian analysts with an expeditionary mindset.

When it comes to the recruitment, development, and retention of military personnel, Joint Manning Documents (JMDs) and current fill mechanisms fall short of what is truly needed. JMDs emphasize numbers while theaters of operations require expertise as well as technology and related collaboration tools and protocols. In identifying key analytical positions, discipline is of utmost importance and commitment is a must to fill such positions. The concept of mass does not necessarily correlate to better analysis when it comes to intelligence. Identification and employment of subject matter experts in combination with those who have expertise and knowledge of collaboration tools do. Once key positions are identified, the implementation plan needs the flexibility to get the right people “on the bus”, and the wrong people “off the bus”[[22]](#endnote-22). Retaining non- and under-performers as well as treating the military “revolving door“ as if it were an entitlement fosters mediocrity and detracts from the critical attributes of a learning and high performance organization. The revolving door should be an incentive to former military who are not only high performers but those who have demonstrated a capacity for continuous learning as well.

In 2007, I was part of an effort to assess and fix manpower and analytical challenges associated with the Combined Intelligence Operations Center (CIOC) in Baghdad, Iraq. Though there was some focus on the number of personnel, in the end, most of the team concluded that the issue was not necessarily quantity, and in fact, I argued we might have had too many executing redundant and non-essential tasks. In the military intelligence field, we understand redundancy as value added because it arguably results in useful competition and fills potential gaps. I agree redundancy can add value and even be essential at times, but as with anything else too much could also become counter-productive. The human capital issue at the CIOC, as in other similar organizations, was on the quality of analysts and subject matter expertise, or lack thereof. We determined that the JMDs were filled with people who had little or no knowledge about the problem set and the short deployment times did not allow them to gain this knowledge. Many analysts were under-performing and only a fraction carried the strategic analytical burden. The global network, or those not physically present in Iraq, but that could have supported the effort had other operational or strategic requirements and customers. In short, at the time we lacked the necessary analytical focus, prioritization, collaboration, and commitment to provide the very best analytical capability to the war effort. A strong commitment from in-theater and CONUS leadership turned things around, but the changes were in spite of institutional flaws. Long-term and lasting solutions require institutional change. The solution calls for a bold vision that allows us to focus on essential tasks with the right people for the right reasons. Present arguments focus on numbers, but our workforce sweet spot demands a better balance. It requires a culture that promotes high performance through policies and practices. It demands a culture that has the flexibility to hire, develop, and retain right people and fire those whose performance is mediocre, a culture that better balances its human capital between the new generation and previous ones.

Two of Accenture’s core values are best people and one global network. After a yearlong fellowship with the corporation, I can attest to how well they live by such values. Accenture aggressively hires the best and brightest from top universities around the world. It empowers the individual with the necessary knowledge creation tools and policies. The latter is essential to moving the workforce from having jobs to having responsibilities, which yields a higher commitment to the organization’s ideology and higher productivity as well. Similar to Accenture, the USIC needs to foster a culture that thrives on change, collaboration, and mobility. Thriving in this environment would result on an institutional capacity to provide community-wide intelligence support anytime, anywhere. Accenture also excels at incentivizing the workforce through feedback, education, and performance-based career progression. The USIC does well in the education and progression of military personnel, not so well within the civilian workforce. Feedback could be better for both civilian and military intelligence analysts. Nothing more gratifying to an intelligence analyst than to learn his or her support is of operational or strategic consequence.

Accenture is at its best when it brings the power of its global network to bear. In spite of its multiple operating groups, growth platforms, and geographic markets, they are fully aware that results from the global network are far greater than its parts. Corporate knowledge creation is achieved through multiple circles with common processes. To them, knowledge is power, but shared knowledge can be revolutionary and certainly of greater value to their clients. Likewise, we need to establish the right policies and ensure leadership emphasis to, overcome ultimately the existing multiple intra- and inter intelligence silos and instead, provide comprehensive knowledge to our customers.

**Recommendation #2. A spider-starfish hybrid, a lean organization with greater interagency analytical collaboration.** Our sweet spot should be a spider-starfish hybrid. Shifting from a spider to a more starfish-like organization would require significant and persistent commitment from the very top as well as active participation from the entire network. Top level commitment and involvement needs to come in the form of vision, process facilitation, and fostering interaction amongst the many interagency tribes. Top leadership involvement would also be crucial in the implementation of the right policies and technologies. The basis for such policies and technologies should increasingly be the result of a bottom-up knowledge creation approach. Clear national intelligence priorities with a clear delineation of stakeholders’ responsibilities and resources would be essential to the facilitation process. Inter- and intra-combatant and national level intelligence silos would need to come down and organizations become interdependent to create comprehensive knowledge as one global network. The proposed shift would be counter to the existing centralized culture and thus would require enormous but necessary persistence.

The information technology strategy within the proposed spider-starfish hybrid model would contain “spider” elements to increase efficiencies and effectiveness. It would have strong IT governance with consolidated and standardized centralize operations, complemented by strong IT performance measurement processes, moving toward a single global desktop image and a single global analysis network.[[23]](#endnote-23) The strategy, however, would also contain significant and arguably revolutionary starfish elements. Using the latest collaboration technologies, it would create communitywide databases that analysts could access regardless of agency affiliation. It would also encourage with tools, policies, and a cultural overhaul true and complete interagency collaboration. Collaboration that would transcend strategic and operational efforts such as the National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) or JIATFs which attempt to solve much larger issues with limited solutions. Our best effort against new threats in a new environment demands bold and revolutionary solutions, not band aid solutions in the aftermath of every crisis. A similar hybrid approach has yielded enormous positive economic and operational results for Accenture, a global powerhouse with a different mission, but similar IT challenges. [[24]](#endnote-24)

The tendency of DoD intelligence organizations, and in fact, the entire U.S. government after the attacks of September 11, 2001 has been toward greater centralization. This is a normal tendency of bureaucracies;, when attacked, they centralize to an even greater extent.[[25]](#endnote-25) Ironically, the more organizationally centralized they become, the less effective they are in confronting adversaries given the new technology landscape. In the protracted war against terrorism, the USIC needs to move toward decentralization, keeping only those centralized practices that act as enablers. The establishment of the Defense National Intelligence Office, the Department of Homeland Security, and more recently, Cyber Command speaks to the persistence on centralization and an insatiable thirst for establishing agencies for command, control, and services. In the end, the result is added redundancy, even duplication. The answer in facing a decentralized world is not more organizations.

A prominent cyber attack in 2009 may illustrate the tendency of centralized organizations to further centralize once attacked, and how the reaction could make one weaker against those who perpetrate such attacks. After the attack and much consternation and significant disruption, procedures were centralized even more and technologies made less available. Users were denied use of external media devices, reducing upload & download capabilities and delaying production cycle. The cyber attack may have intended to disrupt important networks; the centralized reaction, however, may arguably have multiplied the attack’s effectiveness. The answer again is not in adopting a paralyzing and centralized defensive posture, but on capitalizing on current technologies and adopting a more starfish-like posture to confront and better compete in a starfish-like landscape. Standing up a department of homeland defense, appointing a director of national intelligence, creating a cyber command, and other similar initiatives are part of the natural behavior of centralized organizations, but fall short of a solution that can effectively deal with a nimble, ever-changing, and de-centralized threat. We need to find a sweet spot between the two tendencies to optimize our creative nature and human capital. Our increased bureaucratic approach slows us down at a time we ought to be sprinting…speed to value is essential to success in the new environment. The convergence of technology and events has flattened the globe, which requires us to run faster in order to stay in place.[[26]](#endnote-26)

**Recommendation #3.** **Data is king… we need to move from a need-to-know policy to a who- else-needs to know mentality.[[27]](#endnote-27)**  Centralization and stringent need-to-know policies also hamper knowledge creation. Due to the hierarchical nature of military organizations, knowledge and power tend to be concentrated toward the top of the structure, thus limiting the creation and scope of new knowledge and failing to tap a vast sector of the organization’s human capital. It is true that much has been done to emphasize collaboration and collaborative tools within military intelligence organizations to create synergies and benefit from those actions. These efforts, however, have proven insufficient and have lacked the necessary commitment to make them lasting and institutional. All too often, and because of the emphasis on hierarchies, the degree of collaboration and a more relaxed need-to-know practice is limited to the leadership network, rather than extended to the multiple circles to which analysts have access.

To illustrate the point, let me use a personal deployment experience. Even at pinnacle of the war in Iraq in 2007, national and defense intelligence organizations working the Iraq problem set did so relying on internal and isolated databases, and disseminating their analysis in parallel and compartmentalized vectors, ultimately providing the Commander with a fragmented forecast of the threat. It was not until the supported and supporting leadership decided to increase collaboration through database transparency, forward subject matter expertise deployment, breaking down of stove pipes, and tapped into the greater reach-back network that the value and depth of the operational and strategic intelligence offered dramatically improved. It did not reach or unleash the power of full collaboration, but by tapping into the greater network and aggressively leading and managing change with full involvement from an increased number of organizations, operational/strategic intelligence support went from mediocre to expert support, which greatly contributed to the turn of events in 2007. Changes of this magnitude however need to be more than anecdotal. They need to become institutionalized. Changes of this magnitude require behavioral modifications affecting our cultural DNA. Knowledge creation is no longer exclusive to the few. New knowledge creation is amplified through collaboration and it requires much less compartmentalization. Our current degree of interagency compartmentalization restricts creativity and innovation, it is incompatible with Generation Y learning and their knowledge creation upbringing, and ultimately puts us at a disadvantaged.

In an environment where most tactical actions have strategic implications and vice versa, we need to strive constantly for service delivery optimization. Such optimization requires a step greater than transparency of databases, it requires semantic integration. It most importantly requires the DNA change to institutionally and comprehensively leverage our USIC resources as a one global network. Our fragmented and redundant efforts detract substantially from analyzing a diffused threat. We must truly breakdown organizational stovepipes to as a community provide the best intelligence analysis support possible. The closest I have seen data become transparent, integrated, and in support of predictive analysis has been in situations when leadership and analysts have spent an inordinate amount of effort to achieve a temporary field expedient solution.

Most intelligence can and should be shared in every possible way within the USIC. Compartmentalization, which may have worked well as a norm for the USIC in the past, now erodes our present capacity and prevents us from unleashing our one global network potential. Our initiatives to identify enterprise-wide common services often result in vague compromises, unnecessary levels of bureaucracy, and an extreme and outdated application of need to know. In spite of directives to open up and share more at every level of the USIC, our cultural approach continues to be subjugated by a stringent need to know while our adversaries swiftly shift to a good to know mentality. A good to know mentality that increases peripheral vision and analytical affinity to indications and warnings. It maximizes the power of knowledge creation and the use of it. Need to know on the other hand continues to foster isles of knowledge and partial views of a problem set. Need to know and its corresponding compartments frequently result in failures such as the Christmas airline attack in 2009.

Over the past twenty years, I have had the good fortune of working with all military services, multiple agencies, and over sixty coalition partners. In almost every instance, a who else need to know perspective would have yielded better and more comprehensive intelligence for decision makers. Unfortunately, all too often we opt for the path of least resistance, adopting the lowest common denominator of intelligence sharing and collaboration. To all parties involved this low trust collaboration translates to a political statement with little to no intelligence value creation. I have seen firsthand the artificial limitations and regrettable results of the cultural need to know. In the case of partnering with coalition and friends, I have seen us analyze the environment and forecast outcomes without fully capitalizing on their knowledge, even when they have had direct involvement in the area of operations or worse yet when they are indigenous to the area of operations. Even more disheartening is to see isolation under the guise of need to know at the intra and inter agency level. It is perplexing to see the ever increasing number of firewalls within our own network and how they run opposite to the interagency political speak. I too have seen the benefits of joint interagency task forces and they are often a step in the right direction, but much more is needed. We need to culturally shift from need to know to who-else needs to know. We need a transformational change versus incremental improvement in this area. Speed to value is essential. Baby steps in this direction while technology and our adversaries take gigantic steps forward will continue to degrade our competitive analytical advantage.

The most prominent obstacle to establishing a fully interdependent USIC global and flattened network where analysts collaborate with peers across the community instinctively is organizational hubris. Pride at the organizational level gets in the way of a much needed spider-starfish hybrid community. An example of how pride and resulting institutional practices get in the way of comprehensive intelligence analysis is highlighted in the field of human terrain analysis, a daunting challenge in Afghanistan, and one of increasing importance elsewhere. In this case and even though most of the information associated to this topic is unclassified, we too have multiple compartmentalized databases and programmatic solutions, with every organization purporting to have the best alternative. Because human terrain analysis requires collaboration amongst military, think tanks, academia, and coalition, this is an area where excessive compartmentalization underscores more prominently organizational and policy deficiencies.

**Recommendation #4. Need for greater mobility.** Mobility is not just a fad. It is part of our new environment, a part we do not fully exploit, and another best business practice at Accenture. Using the argument of security, we have institutionally decided to significantly limit our play in this space. Nevertheless, such decision hinders optimization of scarce resources and fails to acknowledge new realities. We must make use of present technologies to balance the need for security with the need for collaboration. Risk management is simply a component of the operational process, not the only factor. Technologies are now available to operate in trusted networks whether in a SCIF or away from it. During our fellowship visit to General Dynamics, I learned of the Secure Mobile Environment Portable Electronic Device, also known as Sectera Edge Smartphone. Sectera offers the capability to secure mobile communications. Accenture has similar technologies.We need to use time and space more effectively and in concert with new technologies to provide intelligence anytime, anywhere.

Through technology and policy, we must empower our analysts to remain engaged and connected on demand. Doing so would increase productivity and personal commitment. It would also add flexibility and nimbleness to the organization, increasing speed to value and being more compatible with Gen Y expectations. The Millennial Generation is a force on the move, increasingly interactive, interdependent, and with an insatiable urge to share and collaborate. Understanding fully the new environment, Accenture has increased productivity, quality, and engagement through the implementation of mobile solutions to office communications by empowering team members to network, collaborate, participate in conferences whether visual or voice, and exchange media over wifi broadband secure access network.[[28]](#endnote-28) I type these words from a cubicle in the corner of customer waiting area while my car is serviced. Not advocating to doing exactly the same with intelligence work, but certainly, we can make better use of our human capital while assigned to temporary duty and or when necessary at home. Technology is available to make the most of our time and intellect. Adversaries are making the most of it, so should we. Intelligence organizations vision need to squarely address the dichotomy between institutional security posture and demands of Generation Y for greater openness, collaboration, and accessibility.

Endnotes

1. (Ori Brafman and Rod A. Beckstrom 2006) [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. (Scribd 2009) [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. (United States Government 2010) [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. (Ori Brafman and Rod A. Beckstrom 2006) [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. (Friedman 2005) [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. (Ori Brafman and Rod A. Beckstrom 2006) [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. (Frank Modruson, Accenture 2010) [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. (Ori Brafman and Rod A. Beckstrom 2006) [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
26. (Friedman 2005) [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
27. [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
28. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)