Building Language Skills and Cultural Competencies in the Military:
DOD’s Challenge in Today’s Educational Environment

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With assistance from Maxwell A. Hoffman and Neal J.C. Kumar.
If all our soldiers spoke Arabic we could have resolved Iraq in two years. My point is that language is obviously an obstacle to our success, much more so than cultural. Even a fundamental understanding of the language would have had a significant impact on our ability to operate.

Major Kenneth Carey
Brigade S2, 1st BCT, 1st CAV

Although challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan have certainly brought the importance of language and cultural competency to the fore, the lack of service member proficiency in critically-needed foreign languages is not a new problem. In fact, in World War II, the United States found itself hamstrung by a lack of Japanese, and even German and Italian, speakers. The Subcommittee used two vivid examples at its first hearing describing the contrasting experiences of Senator Daniel Inouye and Private First Class (PFC) Guy Gabaldon in World War II. These incidents dramatically demonstrate the impact that foreign language skills, or the lack thereof, can have on ground forces’ operations. PFC Gabaldon, with some knowledge of Japanese, was able to singlehandedly persuade over 1,500 Japanese soldiers on Saipan to surrender. On the other hand, Senator Inouye’s inability to speak or understand German led to tragedy when he came upon a German soldier who appeared to be reaching for a weapon, only later to learn the soldier was reaching inside his coat for photos of his family. Senator Inouye recalled that the experience haunts him to this day.

During the Cold War and its immediate aftermath, many believed that foreign language skills and regional expertise were only required by a very small segment of the force, usually serving in fairly specialized jobs. Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM underscored the need, and provided the impetus, for both cultural awareness and enhanced pre-deployment language preparation.

Among the many accounts of language and cultural missteps in recent operations, one involving the 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry (1-503d IN) is particularly instructive, not only because it appeared that the adversary was effectively using the cultural divide against the soldiers, but also because the resulting damage could have been easily avoided. While


operating in Ramadi, the unit detained Iraqi women on two occasions in a serious breach of Iraqi cultural norms. As a result, even the populace that would have normally been supportive turned decidedly against the Americans. Even though the events leading to the detention had likely been orchestrated by the insurgents as is common in irregular warfare, the results were no less painful.3

This report will examine the Department’s efforts and progress in addressing, in a systematic, comprehensive manner, difficulties such as those experienced by the 1-503d IN in what it promises will be a “transformation” in its capabilities in language proficiency and cultural competence. While it is clear the Department appreciates the importance of language and culture even to the point of investing in K-16 programs, much work remains.


USAF Photo/Airman 1st Class Christopher Hubenthal.

3 On Point II, 221.
We want to thank our fellow Subcommittee Members and the Subcommittee staff. We would also like to thank all the Members of the House Armed Services Committee, particularly Chairman Ike Skelton and Ranking Member Duncan Hunter. Congressmen George Miller and Rush Holt of the Education and Labor Committee and Sam Farr of the Appropriations Committee deserve special mention for their interest in this important subject. We wish to express our gratitude to Erin Conaton, Bob DeGrasse, Robert Simmons, Paul Oostburg Sanz, Mark Lewis, Paul Arcangeli, Debra Wada, Bill Natter, Timothy McClees, Kevin Gates, Eryn Robinson, Loren Dealy, Lara Battles, Christine Lamb, Joshua Holly, Linda Burnette, Nancy Warner, Rebecca Ross, Cyndi Howard, Everett Coleman and Derek Scott for their support. Finally, we want to thank our own military legislative assistants (MLAs), fellows and schedulers: Dan Madden, James Lively, Toby Watkins, Justin Johnson, Caryll Rice, and Tressa Merola, as well as +the rest of the Subcommittee MLAs for all of their assistance.

We also appreciate the hard work of those outside the committee who assisted in this effort, including those in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the military services, the Department of State, and the Department of Education. In particular, we thank the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff/J-1, and U.S. Special Operations Command Senior Language Authorities, the National Security Agency, and the Office of Postsecondary Education, all of whom responded to our many requests for hearing witnesses, briefings, and documents, as we examined this issue. The only exception to this high degree of support was the Department’s withholding of two documents it considered “deliberative.” We would also like to thank the U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Central Command, Joint Interagency Task Force-South, the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, the Naval Postgraduate School, the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, and Marine Corps Combat Development Command for hosting our visits. In addition, we would like to recognize the Government Accountability Office and the Congressional Research Service for their invaluable assistance. We are particularly indebted to the men and women in the legislative affairs and legislative liaison offices in all of these organizations, whose work with us throughout this project is greatly appreciated.

We also need to acknowledge many experts, including those from several non-governmental organizations including the directors of the Flagship Centers at the Brigham Young University, the University of Texas at Austin, and The Ohio State University for their support of our hearings. We would also like to thank the Center for the Advanced Study of Language at the University of Maryland, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, the Joint Advanced Warfighting Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses, and the Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC).
Our greatest expression of thanks goes to the language professionals, the military personnel in the general purpose forces, and the civilians supporting them who are taking part in this ongoing transformation toward greater language proficiency, regional expertise, and cultural awareness. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we recognize that efforts are underway to improve the mastery of these skills by the citizens of the United States. We look forward to a time when the national security needs of the country will be met and America will be known for its special attention to these areas.

Vic Snyder

W. Todd Akin
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

There is no doubt that foreign language skills and cultural expertise are critical capabilities needed by today’s military to face the challenges of our present security environment. But, only a small part of today’s military is proficient in a foreign language and until recently there has been no comprehensive, systematic approach to develop cultural expertise. This serious national security challenge led the Subcommittee to examine what the Department of Defense is doing to address the need for these capabilities.

The military’s lack of language skills and cultural expertise is a symptom of the larger problem facing the nation as a whole. As we heard in our hearings, our educational system does not place a priority on, and lacks the infrastructure to support, the widespread teaching of foreign languages, not to mention the less commonly taught languages needed by today’s force. Very few states even require language study at all. This significantly limits the pool from which the Department of Defense can recruit linguistically-able personnel and greatly increases the Department's challenge. Consequently, the Department finds itself in the unlikely position of advancing a national educational agenda that encourages states to recognize the importance of language skills and cultural awareness, not only to meet national security needs, but for the United States to remain competitive in the global marketplace, and for states to provide basic services to their citizens.

Today’s military establishment, its active duty, reserve, and civilian personnel, must be trained and ready to engage the world with an appreciation of diverse cultures and to communicate directly with local populations. These skills save lives. They can save lives when the military is performing traditional combat missions, just as they are recognized as critical for performing irregular warfare missions. They can save the lives of our personnel and can greatly reduce the risk to the indigenous, non-combatant populations that the military may be trying to protect or win over. Speaking the language with an appreciation of local culture is a potent tool in influencing a mission’s outcome in our favor.

We found that the Department and the Services have undertaken numerous initiatives, but we are left with several important questions. For example, the Department set a goal of creating foundational language and cultural skills in the force. Yet, the Services’ primary efforts appear to be far more aimed at developing a culturally aware force than a linguistically capable one. The difference between the Department’s goal and the Services’ approach calls into question whether the two even agree on what they are trying to accomplish. The Department must work even more closely with the Services to achieve a common understanding of the language skills needed in today’s force.
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INTRODUCTION

Post 9/11 military operations reinforce the reality that the Department of Defense needs a significantly improved organic capability in emerging languages and dialects, a greater competence and regional area skills in those languages and dialects, and a surge capability to rapidly expand its language capabilities on short notice.

WHY WE DID THIS STUDY

The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations chose to examine the Department of Defense (the Department, DOD) foreign language program’s “transformation” efforts to improve language skills, regional expertise, and cultural awareness capabilities within the Department, not only because of the historic challenge that this transformation represents, but because this is an area with profound implications for the nation’s success at adapting to the realities of irregular warfare.

The Department of Defense has become increasingly aware of the need for its military forces to have enhanced foreign language, regional expertise, and cultural awareness capabilities. In recent years, the Department has studied the issue, and established a number of initiatives, most notably the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap (Roadmap). The Department is also participating in, and sometimes even leading, efforts both internally, within the interagency framework of the federal government, and externally. The latter include working with states, academia, and local businesses on initiatives to improve programs of instruction in the U.S. educational system from kindergarten through university study (K-16).

1 Defense Language Transformation Roadmap, Department of Defense (February 2005).
Congress has played an important role in enhancing the foreign language and cultural awareness capabilities in the Department of Defense. Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress has authorized a number of initiatives and supported various DOD plans to enhance its language capabilities. For example, to attract and retain service members with foreign language and cultural awareness skills, Congress expanded eligibility for Foreign Language Proficiency Bonus (FLPB) pay.\(^3\) Congress has also supported education and training initiatives aimed at improving foreign language capabilities, and it has promoted increased investment in innovative language tools and training technology.\(^4\) Recognizing the nation’s rich linguistic and cultural diversity, Congress is supporting the Department’s creation of a cadre of Americans with skills in critical languages who can serve during times of national need.\(^5\) Congress has also taken an active oversight role in this area. The Subcommittee expects two Congressionally-mandated reports in the next few months, including a detailed annual report on the Department’s foreign language proficiency requirements, which the Department expects to finish by February 2009.\(^6\) Additionally, the Senate Armed Services Committee requested that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) investigate and prepare a study on this subject.\(^7\) By the end of this year, GAO expects to be able to provide the Committee with preliminary observations, in advance of its full report with recommendations planned for spring or early summer next year.

The critical role that foreign language skills, regional expertise, and cultural awareness capabilities play at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels has been borne out as a recurring theme in several of the Subcommittee’s other projects. For example, in reporting on the development of the Iraqi Security Forces and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Subcommittee learned through survey responses from Transition Team and PRT members how much more effective they thought they could have been with more language and cultural training. Through our Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) project, we learned that one product of that effort is “Visual Language Translator for IED Detection Hot Cards” that provide service members with “survival-level language skills in words and pictures.” The Subcommittee heard testimony in its series of hearings on finding a “third way” for Iraq strategy options about the importance, at the operational level, of understanding the cultural and political drivers involved in that conflict. In our project on a new U.S. grand strategy, the Subcommittee received testimony citing the need to engage at the strategic level with the world at large and to better understand our allies, partners, and adversaries, alike, as well as of the need for our national security professionals to have the foreign language skills and cultural awareness to engage and operate more effectively.

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\(^3\) Gail H. McGinn, Deputy Under Secretary Defense for Plans, Department of Defense Senior Language Authority. Statement before the U.S. House, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, hearing on “Transforming the U.S. Military’s Foreign Language, Cultural Awareness, and Regional Expertise Capabilities” (Washington, D.C.: 10 September 2008), 9-10.


In view of these considerations, the Subcommittee undertook this study to determine what the military requirements for these capabilities actually are and what the Department and the Services have been doing and are planning to do to increase language capability, regional expertise, and cultural awareness. The particular emphasis of this report is on determining the proficiency levels in these skill sets that will reside in the general purpose forces. Although it will necessarily touch on military language professionals, such as cryptologic specialists and Foreign Area Officers (FAOs), the report will not focus on these communities. Thus, its objectives and key issues are concerned less with those service members for whom an advanced level of skill is typically required to perform their primary functions. Rather, the report is aimed at the capabilities the Department and the Services are planning to develop for personnel performing tasks in the field, such as conducting street patrols, manning check points, screening detainees, performing maritime security operations, training other nations’ forces, participating in stability and reconstruction activities with local populations, and other operations aimed at winning “hearts and minds.”

**WHAT WE DID NOT STUDY**

Given this report’s focus on the general purpose forces, some ancillary activities merit brief mention, but will not be covered in detail. Among these are the Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) which consist of anthropologists embedded in combat units in Iraq and Afghanistan. The teams, although perhaps not experts in the specific region or language, advise commanders on areas such as local tribal customs and history.8 Interestingly, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan (the subject of an April 2008 Subcommittee report) noted that civil affairs personnel, who would be expected to bring cultural awareness and language capability to the battlefield, were in extremely short supply.9 The shortage of civil affairs personnel and capability may have led to the creation and use of both the PRTs and the HTTs. One result of our PRT report is the Committee’s direction to the Department to report on the role of civil affairs and the requirement for civil affairs capability throughout the spectrum of operations.10 The Department’s report is due in April 2009.

Another joint venture of the Department with academia is the Minerva initiative. Under this program, the Department of Defense has invited universities to apply for grants to study social science topics such as terrorist ideologies, the Chinese military, cultural change in the Islamic world, and Saddam Hussein’s regime.11 Lastly, the potential of developing technologies

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for aiding language study and translation in the field has been left as a topic for further research. We note that the Subcommittee received testimony from the Executive Director of the Center for Advanced Study of Language at the University of Maryland, and is aware of Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) and intelligence community efforts, but these are beyond the scope of this study.

Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, listens to an Arabic translation by Army Sgt. 1st Class Robert Morris at the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center and School on Fort Bragg, North Carolina, March 31, 2008.

*DOD Photo/USA F Technical Sergeant Adam M. Stump.*
While there is general agreement that some level of foreign language skills, regional expertise, and cultural awareness is important for today’s military, determining the optimal proficiency levels and how to distribute such capabilities throughout the general purpose forces is more difficult. The key questions posed in the report largely address this challenge.

**WHAT IS THE REQUIREMENT?**

- What language, regional, and cultural skills do the Department and the Services need, particularly, in the general purpose forces?
- How will the Department take its more abstract vision and goals and translate them into the specific language skills, regional expertise, and cultural awareness capabilities needed to support national security requirements and to conduct operations, and where should these capabilities reside in the force?

**WHAT ACTIVITIES HAS THE DEPARTMENT UNDERTAKEN?**

- What steps have the Department and the Services taken to implement the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap initiative?
- How do the Services organize, train, and equip for language, regional expertise, and cultural awareness?

**WHAT ARE THE COSTS AND RISKS?**

- What are the costs and risks to the nation if the Department and other federal agencies are unable to properly execute the national security strategies due to shortfalls in language skills and cultural capabilities?

**WHAT IS THE DEPARTMENT’S ROLE?**

- The Department’s challenge in meeting its foreign language requirements is a symptom of a nation-wide lack of attention and commitment to this area. What is DOD’s proper role in encouraging the study of foreign languages in the K-16 educational system?
- What is the Department doing to improve opportunities for foreign language, regional, and cultural awareness studies at Department of Defense Education Activity schools for service members’ children, the Service Academies, the Reserve Officer Training Corps programs, and the Professional Military Education master’s degree programs?
BACKGROUND

The Commandant’s Planning Guidance directed the Marine Corps to develop a comprehensive plan to increase our capabilities in irregular warfare by improving foreign language, cultural, and counter-insurgency skills. The end-state will be a career force sufficiently skilled in regional culture and fundamental language familiarization to allow them to act as regional knowledge resources within their units.

Statement of Brigadier General Richard M. Lake, USMC
Director of Intelligence and Senior Language Authority, Headquarters Marine Corps
Before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
September 10, 2008

The shock of the 9/11 attacks has been likened to the surprise launch of Sputnik and has been cited by the Department in connection with its efforts at transforming the language, regional expertise, and cultural awareness capabilities of the force. While the shock of those two events is arguably analogous, it does not appear that the ensuing governmental responses aimed at developing critically needed technical and language skills are equivalent. Sputnik is seen as the impetus for the enactment of the National Defense Education Act of 1958, which provided $887 million over four years for education that could support national security goals, especially training for engineers, scientists, and linguists. This included support for loans to college students; the improvement of science, mathematics, and foreign language instruction in elementary and secondary schools; graduate fellowships; foreign language and area studies; and vocational-technical training. This endeavor was also marked by energetic leadership at the national level. While the Department of Defense contribution is only one part of the current national foreign language program, it remains to be seen whether the sum of the multi-agency initiatives in this effort, with White House leadership, will match the earlier response to the threat of Soviet technological superiority.

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1 Brigadier General Richard Lake, USMC, Director of Intelligence, Senior Language Authority, Headquarters Marine Corps. Statement before the U.S. House, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, hearing on “Transforming the U.S. Military’s Foreign Language, Cultural Awareness, and Regional Expertise Capabilities” (Washington, D.C.: 10 September 2008).
3 Dr. William Berry, Center for Technology and Security, National Defense University. Meeting with Timothy McClees, Professional Staff Member, House Armed Services Committee (Meeting Notes, 25 September 2008).
CURRENT EFFORTS

Only in recent years did the Department explicitly identify foreign language skills and regional expertise as “critical warfighting skills” to be integrated into future operations “to ensure that combat forces deploy with the essential ability to understand and effectively communicate with native populations, local and government officials, and Coalition partners when in theater.”4

In addition, Deputy Secretary Gordon England included strengthening foreign language and cultural awareness capabilities among the Department’s top 25 transformation priorities. The Department cites many recent strategic-level documents, such as the Quadrennial Defense Review, the National Security Strategy and related Strategic Planning Guidance, the Irregular Warfare Execution Roadmap, the Building Partnership Capacity Roadmap, the Strategic Communications Roadmap, and the DOD directive Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations as recognizing the need for increased foreign language, cultural awareness, and regional expertise capabilities.

Two recent high-level documents, in particular, highlight the change that the emergence of irregular warfare has had on the Department’s thinking. The 2008 National Defense Strategy identifies improving the U.S. Armed Forces’ proficiency in irregular warfare as the Department of Defense’s top priority.5 The Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept proposes an expanded role for general purpose forces in supporting and executing irregular warfare missions, which in the past were carried out by special operations forces.6 The Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept calls on the Services to train the force so that “a pool of linguistically and culturally educated personnel capable of operating in priority countries” exists throughout the joint force, not just the special operations force.7 The Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept also asserts that irregular warfare will not be won based solely on military prowess. Rather, it will be won by understanding social dynamics, such as tribal politics, religious influences, and cultural mores. “People, not platforms and advanced technology will be the key to [Irregular Warfare] success.”8

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4 Language and Regional Expertise Planning, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3126.01 (current as of 11 February 2008), A-1.
6 Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, Department of Defense (11 September 2007), 23.
7 Ibid., 23, 41.
8 Ibid., 1. Emphasis in the original.
Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Awareness for the Few

Whereas before, language skills were viewed as critical primarily for intelligence analysts, Foreign Area Officers, and other regional specialists, language skills are now seen as critical operational capabilities – just as important as weapons – on the battlefield and across the entire array of Departmental missions.

“DoD Regional and Cultural Capabilities, The Way Ahead”
Department of Defense
June 2007 Summit

Language Professionals

Foreign language skills still reside primarily in very specific elements of the force and, until now, have not been considered a critical skill needed by the general purpose forces. The term “language professionals” refers to personnel who possess a verified foreign language capability and require this capability to perform their primary functions. This category includes Foreign Area Officers, who have a detailed understanding of a region based on “in-depth and personal knowledge, training, and experience.” This normally includes travel, in-country experience and graduate-level coursework. Importantly, FAOs are also required to have proficiency in at least one foreign language to perform their primary function. While FAOs have typically filled billets in security assistance groups and as defense attachés at embassies, the Army and the Marine Corps are increasingly coding additional billets for FAOs within the Service components of the combatant commands.

Military linguists, including cryptologic specialists, interpreter/translators, and interrogators (increasingly no longer linguists) are the other major element of the force which has advanced foreign language skills. They are enlisted personnel supporting intelligence functions and are also considered language professionals. They are required to maintain an advanced level of foreign language proficiency to perform their primary functions and are qualified to serve in language-designated billets. Most military linguists perform the signals

2 Language and Regional Expertise Planning, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3126.01 (current as of 11 February 2008), D-1.
intelligence mission as cryptologic specialists. Their language training is oriented toward listening and reading, rather than speaking or interpreting.

**EVALUATING THE PROFESSIONALS**

Normally, language-designated billets require that the personnel who fill them demonstrate a specified level of proficiency in certain language abilities, i.e., reading, listening, speaking, and writing. Language skill levels are evaluated by U.S. government agencies, including the Department of Defense, using the widely-recognized Interagency Language Roundtable (ILR) guidelines. The guidelines contain descriptive statements that define six levels of general language proficiency, ranging from “no functional proficiency” in the language (Level 0) up to proficiency that is in all respects equivalent to that of an educated native speaker (Level 5).

In 2005, the Department set a new goal of “general professional proficiency” (Level 3) for language professionals in reading, listening, and speaking. Before 2005, military linguists, including FAOs, were expected to achieve limited working proficiency (Level 2) in reading and listening, and, for FAOs, elementary proficiency (Level 1+) in speaking. The Department set this new goal largely due to pressure from the National Security Agency (NSA), the main “employer” of cryptologic specialists.

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5 Accessed online at: [http://govtilr.org/Index.htm](http://govtilr.org/Index.htm) (3 October 2008).
6 *Language and Regional Expertise Planning*, CJCSI 3126.01, E10-13
7 Colonel Sue Ann Sandusky, USA, Commandant, Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, Commander, Presidio of Monterey. Briefing to Congressman Farr (16 July 2008). (The Defense Language Institute is located in Mr. Farr’s district.)
8 Ibid.
APPARENT LINGUIST SHORTFALL

The Department appears to suffer from “unfilled needs” for linguists. On the “demand” side, the Department of Defense has identified approximately 33,000 billets that have been “coded” as requiring some degree of foreign language proficiency. On the corresponding “supply” side, the Department only pays Foreign Language Proficiency Bonus pay to about 18,000 service members. These numbers alone indicate a sizeable deficiency. They do not give a complete picture of the gap, which may actually be even larger. The calculus is very complex. On one hand, the numbers do not account for factors, such as billets requiring a proficiency level below the threshold needed to qualify for FLPB. Nor do they account for linguists who are in the process of being trained, and who may take up to two years to qualify in their specialty. On the other hand, some service members receive FLPB while serving in non-language-designated billets. Complicating matters further, the Services prioritize their operational and non-operational billets, often filling non-operational units at a lower percentage of their authorized manning.

To better understand the scope and details of linguistic shortfalls, Congress included a provision in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 requiring the Department to submit annual reports on this topic. Although its first report was due in September 2008, the Department does not expect to complete it until February 2009.

REGIONAL AND CULTURAL EXPERTISE

When the Department began its efforts at transformation, it used terms interchangeably, or considered cultural awareness to be a subset of regional expertise. Notwithstanding that earlier imprecision, the Department now sees the two as distinct capabilities. As will be discussed later, the Services have focused much of their efforts for the general purpose forces on ensuring that virtually all service members receive cultural awareness training throughout their service. Regional expertise is a very different matter.

Like language skills, regional expertise as a competency is limited to a very small number of officers, representing an even smaller percentage of the force than military linguists. For example, in 2001 there were fewer than 1,200 FAOs, and by 2007, the total was still only about 1,600. Regional expertise is required within the officer corps in FAOs and Regional Area Officers (RAOs). These RAOs possess many of the same qualifications as

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9 Gail H. McGinn, e-mail message to HASC O&I Subcommittee staff (3 September 2008).
10 See for example, the Strategic Planning Guidance’s Goal 1: “Create foundational language and cultural expertise…” (Defense Language Transformation Roadmap, 1) and Goal 1: “Create Foundational Language and Regional Area Expertise” (Defense Language Transformation Roadmap, 3). See also, Gail H. McGinn, Deputy Under Secretary Defense for Plans, Department of Defense Senior Language Authority. Statement before the U.S. Senate, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, hearing on “Language Technology and Regional Expertise” (Washington, D.C.: 25 April 2007), 1: “Foreign language and regional expertise, which includes cultural awareness, are emerging as key competencies for our 21st Century Total Force.”
11 Ibid. See also “FY 2007 Annual FAO Program Review and Report,” USD(P&R) Memorandum, 4.
Building Language Skills and Cultural Competencies

FAOs, but without the foreign language skills. They serve, for example, as defense attachés, security assistance officers, intelligence officers, or political-military assistance plans and policy officers. Like FAOs, they usually obtain advanced degrees in a regional area specialty.

Special operations forces (SOF) are another element of the force that traditionally possess regional expertise capabilities. Because most SOF units have been geographically oriented, these officers and non-commissioned officers also develop and maintain regional expertise over the course of their careers. SOF units take advantage of the experience that the regional orientation provides and routinely assign senior non-commissioned officers as mentors to newer members to facilitate rapid learning and sustainment. While not considered language professionals, SOF personnel must attain at least some level of foreign language proficiency. Special operations forces, whose members do not include junior enlisted personnel, focus their language training on attaining at least rudimentary conversational speaking skills to enable them to interact with local populations as necessary in order to execute special operations tasks.

Until recently, cultural awareness has not been required or valued as an explicit military competency, apart from what might be possessed by language professionals and regional experts. However, lessons learned from Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM have shown that cultural awareness can be critical and can significantly improve the likelihood of overall mission success. Even if the training evolved over time and on an ad hoc basis, pre-deployment cultural orientation has become the norm for personnel deploying to Afghanistan and Iraq. Aside from this pre-deployment orientation, which focuses more on customs and courtesies than cultural sensitivity, the Services are now focusing on developing what they characterize as cross cultural competence for the entire force.

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14 Jack Donnelly, SOCOM Senior Language Authority, briefing to HASC O&I Subcommittee staff (11 August 2008).
The Roadmap Vision for Transformation: What is the Department Trying to Accomplish, What is the Military Requirement, and How is the Department Trying to Accomplish its Goal

Current military operations demand different skills than those that were mastered to win the Cold War. Today’s operations increasingly require our forces to operate with coalition and alliance partners and interact with foreign populations, in a variety of regions, with diverse languages and cultures. Our enemies blend in with the local population, making identification and achieving victory more difficult. To be effective in stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations, as well as other counterinsurgency measures and to prevail in the long war, we must be able to understand different cultures and communicate effectively in order to gain the support of the local people.

Mrs. Gail H. McGinn
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Plans
Before the Senate Armed Services Committee
Washington, DC, April 25, 2007

In examining DOD’s efforts, the Subcommittee was most interested in understanding in more detail the Department’s precise goals and how it intends to accomplish them. The Subcommittee remains concerned about: (1) how the Department’s transformation will manifest itself within the general purpose forces; (2) how the Department plans to transform those forces; and (3) what the tradeoffs in terms of cost and risk will be in order to transform the force.

While the Department reports that as much as 88% of its initial efforts toward transformation are complete, it also acknowledges that two very critical areas have not yet been satisfactorily resolved. The Department has not yet adopted and implemented an agreed

2 Gail H. McGinn, Deputy Under Secretary Defense for Plans, Department of Defense Senior Language Authority. Statement before the U.S. House, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and
upon process for determining combatant commands’ language, regional expertise, and cultural awareness requirements. Nor has it settled on a process for determining requirements that may emerge in 10 to 15 years. Without the processes to know and project what requirements or capabilities are or will be needed, the Department cannot state with any degree of precision the outcome it is attempting to achieve. Moreover, without knowing the desired outcome, the Services cannot transform their forces to meet those demands. While the Department’s initial transformation efforts were more focused on enhancing language capability, the Services’ efforts appear to be far more oriented toward developing a more culturally aware force. This raises questions about whether the Department and the Services even agree on what the overall end state should be.

Finally, because the Subcommittee continues to have questions about the goals and requirements and the way the Department will get there, we also question whether the true costs and risks can be known at this time.

Delegation leaders from 20 countries commence Fuerzas Aliadas PANAMAX 2008, during an opening ceremony in Panama on August 11, 2008.

DOD Photo/FA PANAMAX 2008 Public Affairs.

WHAT IS THE DEPARTMENT TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH?

THE DEPARTMENT ISSUES THE ROADMAP FOR TRANSFORMATION

As mentioned previously, the Department determined from operational lessons observed in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM that the force needed to be able to understand foreign cultures and communicate effectively with local populations in order to gain their support and reduce the possibility that they would engage in violence against their government, Coalition Forces, or each other. As a result, from 2002 to 2004, the Department undertook some preliminary activities to focus on understanding its language, regional, and cultural requirements, but it determined that work of a more transformational nature was necessary. Figure 1, from a 2004 study the Department commissioned, depicts the kind of change the Department was considering.

In 2004, the Strategic Planning Guidance for FY 2006-2011 directed the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to develop a “comprehensive roadmap to achieve the full range of language capabilities necessary to carry out national security strategy.” The Department published the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap in February 2005. The Roadmap was intended to serve as the “management guide for building language skills and regional proficiency into today’s Force.”

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1 McInerny, SASC statement, 2.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., 3.
THE ROADMAP’S GOALS AND ASSUMPTIONS

Using the explicit direction set in the Strategic Planning Guidance, the Roadmap articulates four broad goals: (1) create foundational language and cultural expertise in the Department’s officer, civilian, and enlisted ranks throughout the force; (2) create a capacity to surge beyond the foundational and in-house capabilities to meet unexpected needs; (3) establish more advanced proficiency levels among the language professional cadre; and (4) improve and expand the Foreign Area Officer Corps. The Roadmap assigns a series of 43 tasks related to each of these goals, and measures progress through the accomplishment of those tasks. To date, the Department reports that about 88% of the tasks have been accomplished.

Strategic-level documents, issued subsequent to the Roadmap, such as the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Irregular Warfare Roadmap, the Building Partnership Capacity Roadmap, the Strategic Communications Roadmap, the DOD directive Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, the Guidance on Development of the Force and the Guidance on the Employment of the Force, all serve to reinforce the Department’s determination that increased language skills, regional expertise, and cultural awareness are needed within the force.

The Defense Language Transformation Roadmap is based on four main assumptions:

♦ Conflict against enemies speaking less-commonly-taught languages and thus the need for foreign language capability will not abate. Robust foreign language and foreign area expertise are critical to sustaining coalitions, pursuing regional stability, and conducting multi-national missions, especially in post-conflict and other than combat, security, humanitarian, nation-building, and stability operations.

♦ Changes in the international security environment and in the nature of threats to U.S. national security have increased the range of potential conflict zones and expanded the number of likely coalition partners with whom U.S. forces will work.

♦ Establishing a new “global footprint” for DoD, and transitioning to a more expeditionary force, will bring increased requirements for language and regional knowledge to work with new coalition partners in a wide variety of activities, often with little or no notice. This new approach to warfighting in the 21st century will require forces that have foreign language capabilities beyond those generally available in today’s force.

♦ Adversaries will attempt to manipulate the media and leverage sympathetic elements of the population and “opposition” politicians to divide international coalitions. 7

For the first goal of creating foundational language and cultural expertise, which is the primary focus of this report, the Roadmap recognized that these have not been generally

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7 Defense Language Transformation Roadmap, Department of Defense (February 2005), 3.
regarded as warfighting skills and have not been valued as core competencies even though, ostensibly, “they are as important as critical weapon systems.”8

**DESIRED OUTCOMES**

The Roadmap set three “desired outcomes” for the goal of creating foundational expertise:

- The Department has personnel with language skills capable of responding as needed for peacetime and wartime operations with the correct levels of proficiency.
- The total force understands and values the tactical, operational, and strategic asset inherent in regional expertise and language.
- Regional area education is incorporated into Professional Military Education and Development.9

To reach those outcomes, the Roadmap outlined a series of actions to be taken. The Department began by formally establishing Senior Language Authorities throughout the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the military departments, the combatant commands, and the defense agencies. The Senior Language Authorities sit on the Defense Language Steering Committee. The Defense Language Steering Committee serves to recommend and coordinate policy, identify current and emerging language and regional expertise needs, and establish language training, education, personnel, and financial requirements.10 The Department also created the Defense Language Program Office to oversee and coordinate policy and provide strategic focus for its efforts.

**THE DEPARTMENT ISSUES NEW GUIDANCE**

Importantly, the Department issued DOD Directive 5160.41E, *Defense Language Program*, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued Instruction 3126.01, *Language and Regional Expertise Planning*. The directive establishes as DOD policy that “[f]oreign language and regional expertise be considered critical competencies essential to the DoD mission.”11 The instruction identifies language skills and regional expertise as both “critical warfighting skills” and core competencies “integral to joint operations.”12 Neither the directive nor the

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12 *Language and Regional Expertise Planning*, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3126.01 (current as of 11 February 2008), A-1.
 instruction explains the significance of labeling these skills sets as *critical warfighting skills* or *core competencies*.

In 2006, the Department reviewed the Services’ doctrine, policies, and guidance to determine whether they identified or treated foreign language skills and cultural awareness as core competencies. It found few instances where doctrine, policy, or guidance addressed or even mentioned that these skills were core competencies, although the analysis did note that many of these publications were in the process of being updated.13 Based upon documents the Department submitted to the Subcommittee, it appears that the Department has not given the Services specific direction to identify language and cultural awareness skills as core competencies. The Department’s briefing materials, however, show this task as complete as of June 2007, which raises the question of whether the Department intends to clarify that the Services must do this.

Clarifying whether the doctrine, policy, and guidance should or must reflect language, regional expertise, and cultural awareness as core competencies and what that actually means could have had an impact on two recently published Army field manuals. Some argue that the *Field Manuals on Operations and Stability Operations* are transformational in their own right due to the new priority they place on the Army’s mission in stability operations. However, the operations manual does not place particular emphasis on the importance of language and makes only passing reference to cultural awareness and regional expertise. The stability operations manual includes a greater emphasis on these skills, but we still question whether the Department would consider that their treatment rises to the DOD-intended level of a core competency.14

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13 *Evaluation of Language Content in Doctrine, Policies & Guidance* and supporting analyses, Tab 2, Sub-Tab C, DOD Response to HASC O&I Document Request (29 August 2008).
14 See FM 3-0, *Operations*, Headquarters, Department of the Army (February 2008), and FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, Headquarters, Department of the Army (October 2008).
WHAT IS THE MILITARY REQUIREMENT?

[Language Skills, Regional Expertise and Cultural Awareness] capabilities are essential for successful maritime security cooperation, maritime domain awareness, humanitarian efforts, and shaping and stability operations. They are critical to Navy expeditionary operations, civil/military affairs, maritime interdiction operations, intelligence, information warfare, criminal investigations, interrogations, debriefings and general translation. They are rapidly becoming part of our warrior ethos and remain a key element in the operational art of naval warfare.

U.S. Navy Language Skills, Regional Expertise and Cultural Awareness Strategy
Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, DC, January 2008

TRYING TO IDENTIFY THE WARFIGHTERS’ NEEDS

The Department acknowledges that it has had difficulty in satisfactorily implementing two critical Roadmap tasks relating to the “requirements” generation process itself. One task involves the identification of the combatant commands’ or warfighters’ foreign language, regional expertise, and cultural awareness requirements. The Department acknowledged in testimony and in meetings with the Subcommittee that the requirements generation process still needs considerable work. One witness described the current situation as being “on the fringe of capturing all requirements.”

Adopting and employing a satisfactory process for determining the combatant commands’ requirements is critical because the Services depend, in large part, on those requirements to inform their force development programs. The Services cannot transform the force to meet new 21st century demands if they do not know what the demands are and how to train and prepare their personnel. Interestingly, the Department, citing the fact that quarterly requirements reports are being made, suggests this Roadmap task was completed in April 2006.

The Language and Regional Expertise Planning instruction establishes the process to “obtain warfighter requirements … to support language transformation.” It gives guidance

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17 Language and Regional Expertise Planning, CJCSI 3126.01, 1.
on how those warfighter requirements should be identified in the planning process and provides specific instruction on how to describe and record the needed level of proficiency. It also gives examples of the kinds of language, regional, and cultural capabilities that commanders and units may need to carry out their core tasks more effectively. The Department reports, however, that each combatant command uses a different methodology, causing them to reach mixed results, some apparently more transformational than others.

The United States Pacific Command (PACOM), for example, is identifying its requirements using its operational and contingency plans. Requirements are identified by categorizing the expected level of foreign contact (i.e., none, minimal, moderate, and heavy) based on a unit’s type and function. As can be imagined, the requirements are very large given the numbers of cultures and languages covered in the Pacific theater. However, most of the need is for lower-level proficiency, rather than for language professionals. The United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has taken a different approach. SOUTHCOM has fewer assigned forces and plans. Consequently, its efforts focus on increasing the foreign language skills, regional expertise, and cultural awareness of its headquarters staff, requiring that a significant percentage of the staff study one of the three primary foreign languages in the region. The Command has an extensive, well-designed support program to enable members to gain, maintain, and enhance language skills and cultural awareness. At this point, its language requirements, even when it receives assigned forces, are assumed not to extend far beyond its existing staff, but SOUTHCOM is reevaluating this stance. Finally, a 2004 report on managing language and regional expertise in the combatant commands noted that the United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) did have a validation process to identify language requirements that could serve as a model. The same report also found that many combatant commands, at the time, routinely had undocumented requirements that “remain unreported and unfilled” and noted that the process for changing planning requirements could take from two to five years.

CAPTURING THE NEW REQUIREMENTS

For the last two years, the Department has received quarterly requirements reports, not only from the combatant commands, but also from the Services and the defense agencies. The reports have shown a marked increase in requirements from 80,000 to 141,000. More than half of the requirements are for basic, low-level skills reflecting an increased demand for use of these skills in the general purpose forces. While this increase may reflect progress in capturing requirements, when a more reliable requirements determination process is in place, the Department will know much more about the scope and level of capabilities the force needs. At the very least, the marked increase in the demand for more basic language skill levels

18 PACOM and SOUTHCOM briefings to HASC O&I Subcommittee staff, Honolulu, HI (30 June 2008) and Miami, FL (28 August 2008).
21 McGinn, HASC statement (10 September 2008), 2.
22 Patton, HASC statement (10 September 2008), 4-5.
will require the Department to develop a test designed specifically to evaluate proficiency for the general purpose forces. The Department’s current tests are not suitable because they are structured to measure the more advanced proficiency of the language professionals.

**PREDICTING FUTURE REQUIREMENTS**

The other critical requirements generation-related task the Department has not completed satisfactorily involves developing a capabilities-based language and regional expertise requirements process for the future, i.e., identifying the emerging language and regional proficiency requirements on a 10-15 year horizon. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy undertook a study, which is still in draft form, analyzing key strategic-level documents. The Department apparently found that the documents suggested that the languages, regions, and cultures where capabilities would be needed are largely those of our European allies. Using that analysis to plan for future language, cultural awareness, and regional expertise capabilities would involve planning for languages that are already considered “dominant in the force,” meaning the Department already has adequate numbers of personnel with sufficient proficiency. It would not result in a focus on “less commonly taught languages,” or areas of the world where the nation’s military forces would more likely find themselves involved. The Department should consider whether additional or alternative analyses might produce more helpful results for determining emerging requirements.

**HOW IS THE DEPARTMENT TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH ITS VISION?**

**WHAT LANGUAGES DOES THE FORCE NEED?**

In Fiscal Year 2006, as the result of another Roadmap tasking, the Department began publishing an annual Strategic Language List of roughly 30 “Immediate Investment” and “Stronghold” languages. As with much of the information provided to the Subcommittee for this project, the Department considers the actual list of languages sensitive information and requested that the list not be disclosed. The Immediate Investment Languages are the languages for which the Department “requires substantial capability in-house,” i.e., among its military and civilian personnel.23 The Stronghold Languages are languages for which the Department needs “an on-call capability for surge response to meet crisis or contingency needs,” possibly using civilian reserve linguists, contractors, or allied personnel.24 Together, the Immediate Investment Languages and the Stronghold Languages are the priorities for current and projected needs through the year 2015, based on the National Security Strategy, the

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National Defense Strategy, and the needs articulated by the military departments, combatant commands, and defense agencies.

The Department uses the Strategic Language List for a number of things. It provides guidance for the Services’ personnel accession systems and establishes education and training requirements for officer, enlisted, and civilian personnel. The list also informs the Services of the relative priority of languages for the payment of Foreign Language Proficiency Bonus pay. Additionally, the Services are authorized to pay Foreign Language Proficiency Bonuses for languages not on the Strategic Language List if they have current or future mission requirements for those languages.

WHAT LANGUAGE SKILLS DOES THE FORCE ALREADY HAVE?

The Department and the Services also began conducting a one-time self assessment screening of military (mandatory) and civilian (voluntary) personnel for foreign language skills. While not all personnel responded, the screening gave the Department some sense of the depth and breadth of existing foreign language capabilities among active and reserve military personnel and DOD civilians. Although it was required by December 2005, the Army is still in the process of conducting its screening and has not yet reported its results due to the large number of personnel who are deployed.

Of those screened, 217,200 personnel reported that they had some foreign language ability. The screening showed that personnel had some level of language facility in as many as 360 languages and dialects. The bulk of this ability is in Spanish, French, and German, however, which the Department characterizes as “dominant in the force.” Over 12,000 personnel reported that they had some skill in Arabic, Dari, and Pashto, which is a sharp increase from the number of tested linguists in the force in 2001.

For the most part, the Department has not tested personnel to validate the skill level reported in the self assessment, but the Services have encouraged personnel to be tested so that they can receive proficiency pay, where possible. The Department has entered the screening information into a Department-wide database, which allows the Department to identify and track personnel with foreign language skills for operational or contingency

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purposes. But, as discussed below, the Department, with the exception of the Marine Corps, has not made the data part of its personnel and manpower databases.

**MATCHING SKILLS WITH NEEDS**

To further transformation and identify gaps in foreign language capabilities, the Department is in the process of creating the Language Readiness Index (LRI). The Index is intended to be a strategic management tool that will identify resources, i.e., the Total Force’s language and regional capabilities, and measure them against demand, i.e., language and regional capabilities requirements. While the Index is not an assignment tool, it will allow the Department to recognize where gaps exist between mission requirements and available resources, assess the associated risk, and take needed action. When the Index is fully operational, it is supposed to enable the user to take a language requirement and find an exact match. If an exact match cannot be found, using a set of business rules the Index tool will find the closest match.

The Department expects to use the Index for strategic and adaptive planning to help planners match resources against requirements. The Index is being integrated into the Department’s broader Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS), which is intended to make language skills, cultural awareness, and regional expertise capabilities and gaps visible for the first time in the Department’s system for determining overall readiness. The Department is developing the software to include cultural and regional awareness dimensions to the Index as well. Targeted for an initial operational capability in January 2009, the Index will include not only data on the language, cultural, and regional awareness of military personnel, but also civilian personnel and other potential outside sources.²⁸

While it will be beneficial to integrate the LRI with the DRRS, neither system is compatible with the Services’ human resources management systems. Absent a language or regional expertise secondary/tertiary occupational code or special experience identifier, the personnel and

manpower databases will be separate and distinct from the LRI and DRRS. The OSD, Joint Staff, COCOM, and Service databases and systems must be able to “talk” to each other in order to be effective in identifying actual personnel to fill temporary or permanent billets, or to identify for a commander what capabilities his or her unit actually possesses.

**LANGUAGE SKILLS AND READINESS REPORTING**

Although it identifies gaps in requirements, the LRI does not appear to be a tool for measuring unit readiness. It appears that only the Navy is including an assessment of language, regional expertise, and cultural awareness capabilities in unit readiness reporting. The Navy has established a mission essential task for cultural awareness. This allows the Navy to standardize cultural awareness training and track whether a unit has trained to the cultural awareness mission essential task. The results will be made part of individual unit readiness reporting. We note that none of the other Services indicate similar attempts to address these capabilities in their unit readiness reporting.

**BRINGING MORE LANGUAGE SPEAKERS INTO THE FORCE**

The Department’s Roadmap required the Services to develop plans to recruit native or heritage speakers of difficult or high demand languages. Each of the Services took a different approach, which will be described in greater detail later. Execution of these Service recruiting efforts, however, depends in part on the definition of the combatant commands’ requirements.²⁹

The Roadmap also included a number of tasks addressing foreign language training for officers who are not necessarily FAOs or RAOs. Prior to commissioning, the Department will increase the number of junior officers with foreign language training by requiring more students, at the Service Academies and in the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), to study foreign languages. In addition, the Department, through the ROTC Language and Culture Project, a program overseen by the National Security Education Program, is awarding competitive grants to ROTC schools to improve their programs for languages of strategic interest. In the past two years, the Department has awarded 12 grants to colleges and universities like San Diego State University, Indiana University, the University of Texas at Austin, Texas A & M University, and the University of Mississippi.³⁰ Through the grants, ROTC students will be given increased exposure to critical languages through a variety of means including the opportunity for immersion study abroad. The Army’s Training and Doctrine Command challenged the five senior military colleges to collectively produce the same number of officers as West Point. Targeting grants to major ROTC feeder schools,


particularly the five senior military colleges, may be an appropriate way to increase the number of officers with needed proficiency in critical languages.

The Roadmap also seeks to make available one-year assignments for junior officers to serve overseas with foreign forces and to ensure that these officers are rewarded through advancement. Additionally, the Roadmap calls for the expansion of opportunities for officers to study abroad through summer immersion programs, scholarship programs like the Fulbright, Olmsted, Marshall, and Mansfield scholarships, and foreign professional military education at all levels. Finally, the Department informed the Subcommittee that additional cultural awareness and regional training for officers is included in the curriculum at the Service Academies and for ROTC cadets and midshipmen.

MAKING LANGUAGE SKILLS COUNT

Another Roadmap task seeks to make foreign language ability a criterion for advancement to the rank of flag or general officer, ostensibly raising expectations that the most senior-level leadership in the force would begin to possess foreign language skills. This would have the effect of emphasizing the importance of language skills throughout the officer corps.

In August 2006, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued guidance that promotion board precepts, along with four other “key areas,” should emphasize the following: “Experiences and education that contribute to broader cultural awareness and enable better communication in a global operating environment are crucial underpinnings to support strategic national interests.” The memorandum instructed the Services to review and revise their promotion board precepts to ensure that the five key areas are given the “right degree of emphasis.” This direction to the Services appears to fall far short of the Roadmap tasking and gives the Services wide latitude in how much emphasis to accord it. Although the Services recognize the value of language skills for senior officers, the Services, with the possible exception of the Air Force, are not making language proficiency a criterion for advancement. This calls into question how important the Department and the Services consider language ability to be.

31 The five senior military colleges are North Georgia College, Texas A&M University, Norwich University, Virginia Military Institute, and The Citadel.
32 Defense Language Transformation Roadmap, 7.
33 Ibid., 8.
34 “Promotion Board Guidance,” Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness) (3 August 2006).
35 Ibid.
36 Response to Question for the Record from hearing before the U.S. House, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, on “Transforming the U.S. Military’s Foreign Language, Cultural Awareness, and Regional Expertise Capabilities” (Washington, D.C.: 10 September 2008), CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-05-007 (received 20 October 2008).
The Subcommittee questions whether the Deputy Secretary’s guidance, which is less than prescriptive, will actually have the effect of making language skills a criterion for advancement to general or flag officer rank. The Subcommittee notes that two Army FAO brigadier generals serve as defense attachés in critical postings in Moscow and Beijing. While these assignments may represent progress for the FAO program, it remains to be seen whether senior officers serving as combatant commanders or task force commanders will have those skills in the future. In fact, one of the reasons the Services cite for not making language ability a criterion for advancement is that, in their view, few general or flag officer assignments would require foreign language proficiency.

**ADDITIONAL FOCUS ON REGIONAL AND CULTURAL CAPABILITIES**

In June 2007, the Department hosted a department-wide summit called the *Regional and Cultural Expertise Summit: Building a Framework to Meet National Defense Challenges*. This senior-level summit focused on understanding mission demands and developing a framework to synchronize policies, plans, and programs to meet those demands. In October 2007, the Department published a white paper entitled, *DoD Regional Capabilities, The Way Ahead*. The Department recognized that globalization and rapid advances in information technology combine to make the world ever more interconnected and therefore, it is increasingly important to have advanced knowledge of other languages, regions, and cultures. The summit participants suggested that the Department had made significant progress in the transformation of language capability, but agreed that it was time to address regional and cultural competencies in a similar fashion. The white paper argues that regional and cultural competencies, as well as language skills, need to “become a fundamental component of the Department’s DNA.” Participants recognized they needed to take immediate actions, but that these actions had to be rooted in a strategic plan that included collaboration with interagency, academic, and international partners. The white paper sets these major tasks:

- Establish common terms of reference and a typology for identifying, developing, measuring, and managing regional and cultural capabilities;
- Define and prioritize the Department’s strategic and operational demands for regional and cultural needs;
- Operationalize the Department’s regional and cultural needs; and
- Partner with the public and private sectors in solutions.

Each of the above tasks was accompanied by more specific actions and considerations for their implementation. The Department has not yet completed the strategic plan.

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39 Ibid., 6.
40 Ibid., 6.
Culture and foreign language capabilities have become essential enablers for conducting military operations. Our operational environment requires an agile and dynamic force, both today and in the future. That force must be capable of operating across the full spectrum of conflict, in an increasingly multicultural environment. To provide this capability, The Army envisions an end state where Soldiers, leaders, and units have the right blend of culture and foreign language knowledge, skills, and attributes. They need these capabilities to facilitate full spectrum operations across operational themes from Major Combat Operations to Peacetime Military Engagement.

Statement by BG Richard C. Longo, USA
Director of Training, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7
U.S. Army Senior Language Authority
Before the House Armed Services Committee Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee
September 10, 2008

In addition to the tasks assigned to them in the Roadmap, the Services, as the force providers who organize, train, and equip the force, have undertaken several initiatives of their own. Some of these efforts pre-date the Roadmap. Other initiatives have begun under the Roadmap’s direction and other Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance. Cultural awareness, or what the Services now call cross-cultural competence, is the area where they have centered their efforts. Witnesses who testified before the Subcommittee contended that, if forced to make a tradeoff, cultural awareness capabilities may be more important than language capabilities, particularly in the general purpose forces. The Department also shares the view that the general purpose forces require cultural awareness as a capability in, and of, itself. The question remains, however, whether the Services’ efforts will achieve the vision laid out in the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap’s policy guidance, making language skills, regional expertise, and cultural awareness critical warfighting skills and core competencies.

SERVICE STRATEGIES

The Services have drafted or published strategies for language, regional expertise, and cultural awareness. The Services’ strategies all aim to establish the baseline or framework from which to organize and train their forces, but speak only in generalities such as developing the “right mix” of language, culture, and regional expertise capabilities. The Services recognize that they do not yet know what the right mix is to meet Departmental, combatant command, and their own internal Service requirements. As discussed, the Department and the Services agree that the process for establishing combatant command requirements is a vital area that needs improvement.3 The issue is critical because without identification of those requirements, the Services’ ability to build and provide the force with the proper mix of capabilities becomes far more difficult, if not impossible. Even without a validated process for establishing detailed combatant command requirements, the Services are building the approaches needed to develop forces with at least some capabilities. In general terms, the strategies focus on a combination of career-long force development and “just in time” tailored pre-deployment training as the principal means for developing the needed capabilities.

THE NAVY

In January 2008, the Navy published the U.S. Navy Language Skills, Regional Expertise and Cultural Awareness Strategy (LREC). The LREC strategy acknowledges the importance of language skills, regional expertise, and cultural awareness as important enablers. The Navy strategy states that “cultural awareness and regional knowledge transcend foreign language skill in terms of total force priorities.”4 Cultural awareness is the critical training needed by all Navy personnel, with language proficiency and regional expertise needed by only some personnel.5 The Navy encapsulates its overall approach as: “Language proficiency for some (not all) Sailors. Regional

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3 See, Heritage Recruiting Language Strategic Plan, Air Force Recruiting Service (undated).
5 Ibid., 7.
Expertise for some (not all) Sailors. Cultural awareness for all Sailors.” However, determining who the “some” is proving difficult.

The strategy explicitly sets, as a priority, defining the Navy’s requirements. The Navy recognizes that it still needs to articulate specific competencies, levels of expertise, and capacities needed by the force. The Navy also seeks to identify, define, and institutionalize those mission essential tasks that are related to language and regional expertise. In June 2007, the Navy adopted a mission essential task for cultural awareness. Establishing mission essential tasks for these capabilities serves as the first step in standardizing training and factoring that training into unit readiness, an approach for which at least two members of the House Armed Services Committee have long argued.

The Army

The Army is in the process of drafting a strategy. The Army’s Senior Language Authority testified before the Subcommittee that its draft Culture and Foreign Language Strategy focuses on providing “a baseline of culture and foreign language capabilities required of all Soldiers in the General Purpose Forces.” The Army’s end state is a “balanced” set of cultural and foreign language competencies for its soldiers and its leaders, and an Army with all units having the “right blend” of cultural and foreign language capabilities. Like the Navy, the Army recognizes that it does not yet know what the right balance or blend will be and that it still must establish its requirements.

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1 Language, Regional Expertise and Culture (LREC) Transformation in the U.S. Navy: A Status Report, briefing to HASC O&I Subcommittee staff (July 2008), slide 3.
2 U.S. Navy Language Skills, Regional Expertise and Cultural Awareness Strategy, CNO, 9.
3 Ibid., 11.
4 Rear Admiral Daniel P. Holloway, USN, Director, Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division (OPNAV N13). Response to Question for the Record from hearing before the U.S. House, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, on “Transforming the U.S. Military’s Foreign Language, Cultural Awareness, and Regional Expertise Capabilities” (Washington, D.C.: 10 September 2008), CHARRTS No.: HASCO1-05-006 (received 20 October 2008).
6 Longo, HASC Statement (10 September 2008), 5.
7 Ibid., 4.
BUILDING LANGUAGE SKILLS AND CULTURAL COMPETENCIES

THE AIR FORCE

The Air Force, which is in the process of finalizing its *Culture, Region & Language Strategy*, uses as its central concept “Airmen Statesmen,” i.e., airmen skilled enough to influence behavior in culturally complex settings. The Air Force determined that all airmen need some level of cultural and regional awareness, but the need for language skills depends on an airman’s mission and role. The Air Force places a particular emphasis on providing training in cross-cultural negotiations. General cross-cultural training will be made part of training for all airmen and will be a part of professional military education and development throughout a member’s career. Culture-specific training will be provided to certain airmen based on assignment, deployment, or specialty code. Except for language professionals, airmen will primarily become “language-enabled” through language familiarization training provided “just in time” to meet tactical mission requirements, i.e., pre-deployment training.

In an effort to better understand where language and cultural skills would enhance mission performance, the Air Force commissioned a RAND study. RAND surveyed 6,000 recently deployed airmen to determine the relative importance and evaluate the frequency with which they performed tasks requiring cultural knowledge, which included language skills, while deployed.

RAND’s forthcoming monograph, which is not yet cleared for open publication, reached several interesting conclusions. As might be expected, airmen who had deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan tended to view overall cultural skills as more important than those who had deployed elsewhere. RAND also found that certain personnel, like special investigations

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14 McDade, HASC statement (10 September 2008), 3.
agents and public affairs personnel, placed a higher value on cultural skills than did others, such as, pilots. Most notably, however, RAND found that airmen across the board rated language skills as less important for deployment than many other cultural factors, including “social etiquette” and the “ability to manage stress caused by an unfamiliar cultural environment.”

THE MARINE CORPS

While the Marine Corps does not have a specific strategy, it draws its guidance from the Marine Corps Vision & Strategy 2025, and is instituting a Career Marine Regional Studies Program. The Marine Corps’ 2008 posture statement cited its “across the board” efforts “to enhance language skills where we have previously been weak.” The Marine Corps approach to developing foreign language, cultural awareness, and regional expertise capabilities is a combination of pre-deployment training, professional military education, and individual study. In fiscal year 2009, the Marines Corps is beginning development of a Career Marine Regional Studies program which eventually will be required of all career force Marines, i.e., all officers and all enlisted Marines who choose to reenlist. Under the program, all Marines will complete an Operational Culture course during their first year of service. All career force Marines will be assigned a region of the world and must complete a Career Marine Regional Studies course. In addition, all career force Marines will study a related language through Language Learning Resource Centers, established at all major Marine Corps installations, and language learning software, currently Rosetta Stone® over the course of their careers in order to ensure skill progression and sustainment.¹⁵

¹⁵ Career Marine Regional Studies Program (CMRS) Brief (7 October 2008), slides 2-4; United States Marine Corps Language & Training, briefing to HASC O&I Subcommittee staff (25 August 2008), slide 16. See also, National Defense, “Ready, Aim, Specialize!” (September 2008).
ADDITIONAL SERVICE INITIATIVES

LEADERSHIP

Even before publication of the Roadmap, each of the Services designated a Senior Language Authority. Interestingly, they come from different functional communities: operations, intelligence, and personnel. The Army designated its Senior Language Authority from the operational community. The Marine Corps designated its Senior Language Authority, notably a FAO general officer, from the intelligence community. The Navy and the Air Force designated officials from the personnel field, as did the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE

In addition to developing strategies and naming SLAs, each of the Services has established a Center of Excellence for language and cultural awareness. In 2004, the Army established the Training and Doctrine Command Culture Center (TCC) in the U.S. Army Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. The TCC serves as the Army proponent for cultural awareness, provides culture education and training, and develops educational products for the Army as well as the other Services. TCC products and services answer four questions: What is “culture”? What is American culture? What is the culture in the contemporary operating environment (COE)? What is culture’s impact on military operations?16

In 2005, the Marine Corps stood up the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) at Quantico Marine Corps Base, Virginia, as its focal point for operational culture and language familiarization programs. The Marine Corps defines operational culture as “those aspects of cultural knowledge information and skills most relevant to successful planning and execution of military operations across the spectrum of conflict.” The CAOCL mission is to “[e]nsure Marines and Marine units are equipped with requisite regional, culture and operational language knowledge to assist them to plan and operate successfully….”17

The other Services followed suit in 2006. The Navy opened its Center for Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (CLREC) in the Center for Information Dominance at Corry Station, Pensacola, Florida. The CLREC provides tailored language and culture training in support of specific fleet operations. “[C]onceived as a clearinghouse for training, [it] has gradually expanded to include development of individual country and regional studies tailored

16 TRADOC Culture Center Information, U.S. Army Fact Sheet (undated).
to fleet operations.” 18 In collaboration with other Navy schools and the Defense Language Institute, the CLREC’s focus is on pre- and mid-deployment training for the Navy’s general purpose forces.

The Air Force created the Air Force Culture and Language Center within the Air University at Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base Montgomery, Alabama. This is the “Air Force-level Center with the unique mission to develop expeditionary Airmen by synchronizing education and training across [the Air Force’s Professional Military Education] schools and expeditionary airman training venues.” It “provides Airmen at all ranks with the best available understanding of foreign cultures and the competencies to communicate and collaborate with members of foreign societies.” The Center’s primary focus is the enhancement of cross-cultural competencies. 19

**SERVICE-SPECIFIC STRATEGIC LANGUAGE LISTS**

The Services have developed their own Service-specific Strategic Language Lists, which add to the Department’s list those languages of concern that are not on the departmental list. The Services are authorized to pay Foreign Language Proficiency Bonus pay for proficiency in these additional languages.

**SCREENING FOR FOREIGN LANGUAGE CAPABILITY**

As discussed, the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap tasked the Services with conducting a one-time screening of military personnel as well as civilian volunteers. Prior to this screening, the Department did not have a systematic way of determining what foreign language capabilities resided in the force. Each Service devised its own methodology for screening. The Army has not yet completed its screening, citing the large number of its personnel who are deployed. The Army has been able to screen at least 83,000 personnel, 53% of whom reported some language ability. 20 The Army is considering ways to enable it to complete the screening process, but it did not provide a timeline for its completion. 21

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The Marine Corps began screening new Marines in 2002 and directed the screening of all military and civilian personnel in 2003, using the screening to establish a baseline database of language skills. It screens officers at its entry-level officer training course, The Basic School, and tests them once they reach the operating forces. All enlisted Marines are screened at boot camp and most are tested before leaving. The Marine Corps Foreign Language Program Manager tracks the tested personnel and the Manpower Management System assigns a secondary military occupational specialty code as a Military Interpreter for Marines with demonstrated language proficiency. The Marine Corps also screens new civilian hires.

The Subcommittee observes that the Marine Corps plan might be a “best practice” for the other Services to consider. If not a secondary occupational or specialty code or rating, a special experience identifier could be used to track those who, while not professional linguists or FAOs, have validated training or education in a specific language. This goes beyond the LRI, as discussed earlier, which is self-reported and not tested or validated. However, as a reminder, whatever system is used to identify and track people, the systems and databases must “talk” to each other in order to be effective command tools.

The Air Force conducted its screening and found that a significant number of personnel reported some language capability, primarily in languages the Department considers strategic. The Air Force screens all officers upon accession, but is limiting screening of enlisted members to those requesting jobs that require language skills. Air Force civilians have the ability to input information about their language skills in the Air Force’s human resources database, but they are not formally screened.

The Navy also found a very large number of military personnel who reported some language capability, with the vast majority of it in strategic languages. The screening produced “over 140,000 assessments (not people – some people are fluent in multiple languages) of proficiency in more than 300 separate languages and dialects.” The Navy found that roughly half of the capability was in Spanish, with sizeable capability in French, German, and Tagalog as well. However, the screening also showed that Navy personnel had capabilities in more obscure and less commonly taught languages. The Navy made screening compulsory at all accession points in 2006.

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23 Lake, HASC statement (10 September 2008), 4.
26 Ibid.
FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY BONUS PAY

One of the main ways the Department plans to increase its foreign language capability is through the use of Foreign Language Proficiency Bonus pay. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 significantly increased the Foreign Language Proficiency Bonus pay for service members with certified language proficiency. In order to be eligible, military personnel have to meet at least one of the following criteria:

- Qualified in a military career specialty requiring proficiency in a foreign language.
- Received training, approved by his or her service, designed to develop proficiency in a foreign language.
- Assigned to military duties requiring proficiency in a foreign language.
- Certified proficiency in a foreign language for which the member’s Service has identified a critical need.

Normally, service members have to demonstrate a limited working proficiency (Level 2) to qualify for the proficiency bonus pay. The Services, however, may authorize payment to members whose duties require lower levels. The Marine Corps, for example, will pay FLPB to Marines in any military occupational specialty for what it calls “Global War on Terrorism Languages,” including Arabic, Dari, and Pashto, even if they test at an elementary proficiency (Level 1) and are not serving in Iraq or Afghanistan.

One issue that may warrant further review involves the anomaly in the special operations forces’ eligibility for Foreign Language Proficiency Bonus pay. Some Services pay their SOF personnel FLPB pay at the elementary level (Level 1). Other Services require Level 2 proficiency, a level higher than is required to perform the SOF mission.

Post 9/11 military operations reinforce the reality that the Department of Defense needs a significantly improved organic capability in emerging languages and dialects, a greater competence and regional area skills in those languages and dialects, and a surge capability to rapidly expand its language capabilities on short notice.

“Heritage Recruiting Language Strategic Plan”
Air Force Recruiting Services

28 Foreign Language Proficiency Bonus (FLPB), Department of Defense Instruction 7280.03 (20 August 2007), 4.
29 Ibid., 6.
30 Brigadier General Richard M. Lake, USMC, Director of Intelligence, Senior Language Authority, Headquarters Marine Corps, and Jeffery Bearor, USMC, Executive Deputy, Training & Education Command, briefing to HASC O&I Subcommittee staff (25 August 2008).
31 Heritage Recruiting Language Strategic Plan, Air Force Recruiting Service (undated).
RECRUITING INITIATIVES

The Services’ recruiting efforts to increase foreign language, cultural awareness, and regional expertise capabilities in the force, required by the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap, appear to center on the establishment of native and heritage speaker recruiting plans loosely modeled on the Army’s program.

The Army now has four recruitment programs for native and heritage speaking communities: (1) 09L Translator Aide, (2) Language Advocates, (3) Foreign Language Recruiting Initiative, and (4) English as a Second Language (ESL) Enlistment Option. The 09L Translator Aide program began in 2003 and aimed to recruit native and heritage speakers of Arabic, Dari and Pashtu. To date, the Army has recruited and trained over 600 native and heritage speakers who often have advanced language proficiency as well as cultural awareness. The Army considers this program highly successful and converted it from a pilot program in 2006 into its own military occupational specialty with an established career path. The Army is planning to expand the program to recruit native and heritage speakers of languages in the U.S. Africa and Pacific Commands’ areas of operations. Older programs the Army already had in place include the Army Language Advocate program, begun in 1999, which aims to recruit personnel for military intelligence occupations. Military linguists are educating recruiters on military intelligence opportunities and are working with recruiters to conduct outreach in ethnic communities. The Army’s Foreign Language Initiative, begun in January 2002, recruits Spanish speakers who have limited English capability. Under this program, recruits complete English language training before attending Basic Training. The Army’s English as a Second Language Program, which began more than 10 years ago, appears to be similar, but provides English training for Arabic and other native speakers as well as Spanish.

The Air Force developed a recruiting plan in 2005 that it characterizes as a “response to a generic request from [the Office of the Secretary of Defense] because the Combatant Commands have not yet quantified their capabilities-based language requirements. The Air Force plan only shows the intended procedures to accomplish heritage recruiting. The plan will be further refined once the requirements from COCOMs are established.” The Marine Corps does not have a specific heritage and native speaker recruiting plan. Instead, the Marine Corps relies on its Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning as the “cornerstone to

33 Longo, HASC Statement (10 September 2008), 9.
35 Longo, HASC Statement (10 September 2008), 9.
36 “Information Paper,” Tab 7, Sub-Tab B, 2.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Heritage Recruiting Language Strategic Plan, 2.
sufficiently address” the Marine Corps’ requirements. The Marine Corps did establish incentives for recruits with certain levels of language proficiency. It also assigns heritage speakers to its recruiting command for assignments in areas where communities of critical language heritage or native speakers live. The Navy’s native and heritage speaker recruiting plan aims to recruit personnel with language skills in certain strategic languages, such as Arabic, Pashto, Kurdish, Somali, Farsi, and Tamil. The Navy plans to recruit these personnel into occupational ratings, like Hospital Corpsmen, Masters at Arms, or Seabees, where they have wider assignability and are more likely to use their skills.

**ENHANCING OFFICERS’ CAPABILITIES**

**INCREASING LANGUAGE REQUIREMENTS AT THE SERVICE ACADEMIES AND IN ROTC PROGRAMS**

As discussed, the Services are taking steps to require more officers to receive foreign language training before entering service. The United States Military Academy and the United States Air Force Academy require all students to take at least two semesters of a foreign language. Humanities and Social Science majors at the United States Military Academy and non-technical majors at the Air Force Academy must take four semesters. The United States Naval Academy, however, only requires non-technical majors, which comprise 40% of the student body, to take four semesters of a foreign language. The remaining 60% are not required to study a foreign language, but may study it as an elective. For ROTC cadets and

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40 “Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of the to HASC O&I Document Request (29 August 2008).
41 United States Marine Corps Language & Training, briefing to HASC O&I Subcommittee staff, slide 8.
43 Ibid.
44 McGinn, HASC Statement (10 September 2008), 11.
45 Ibid., 11-12.
46 Ibid., 12.
midshipmen, the Air Force requires all scholarship, non-technical majors to take four semesters of a foreign language and the Navy requires all midshipmen to take a cultural studies course.47 Currently, the Army only encourages its ROTC cadets to study a foreign language, but it is considering making it a requirement for all contracted cadets. The Army began a pilot program this summer to award incentive pay to contracted cadets who choose to study critical foreign languages.

MAINTAINING AND IMPROVING PROFICIENCY

The Services have increased officers’ opportunities to maintain and improve foreign language proficiency, regional expertise, and cultural awareness through a variety of means. The Services report that they are all increasing programs in their professional military education venues at the primary, intermediate, and senior levels, both in their resident and non-resident programs. The Marine Corps Command and Staff College has expanded its language and culture programs and the Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting is funding programs to study abroad.48 The Navy also established the Regional Security Education Program, through which Naval Postgraduate School faculty provide graduate-level instruction to Navy personnel afloat.49 The Navy also notes that its Officer Community Managers now have additional flexibility to include language training in the career path for officers who require a language skill.50 The Air Force requires officers to study Chinese, Arabic, Spanish, or French at its intermediate-level school and adds Russian to this list at its war college. The Services are also using programs like the Olmsted scholarship and military personnel exchange programs, as well as access to language learning software at no cost, to provide opportunities to maintain or improve foreign language skills and cultural capabilities.

PROVIDING OPPORTUNITIES TO ACQUIRE A LANGUAGE

The Services report that there are also some additional opportunities for military personnel to acquire a foreign language. Since fiscal year 2008, the Navy has been planning and resourcing 100 seats per year at the Defense Language Institute for officers who are not designated as Foreign Area Officers.51 While not for officers, the Marine Corps is reserving 40 seats annually at the Defense Language Institute, as a critical language reenlistment incentive program, which allows enlisted Marines of any specialty, including those who would not normally require language proficiency as part of their normal duties.52 The Department, in 2006, authorized the payment of tuition assistance for foreign language courses at post-secondary institutions in languages on the Strategic Language List. The assistance is available

47 McDade, HASC Statement (10 September 2008), 9, and Holloway, HASC Statement (10 September 2008), 8.
48 Lake, HASC Statement (10 September 2008), 5.
49 LREC Transformation in the U.S. Navy: A Status Report, briefing to HASC O&I Subcommittee staff, slide 12.
50 Holloway, HASC Statement (10 September 2008), 7.
51 Ibid.
52 Lake, HASC Statement (10 September 2008), 10.
even if the courses are not part of a plan to obtain a degree. Military personnel also have the opportunity to acquire language skills at no personal cost through online software, currently *Rosetta Stone.*

**PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING**

Pre-deployment training plays, and will continue to play, an extensive role in the Services’ approach to providing language familiarization, cultural awareness, and regional information to support mission requirements for general purpose forces. DOD policy now explicitly requires that “[m]ilitary units deploying to, or in transit through foreign territories shall be equipped, to the greatest extent practicable, with an appropriate capability to communicate in the languages of the territories of deployment or transit. The Commanders of the Combatant Commands shall determine what is appropriate based on current situation and circumstances.”

This flexibility has allowed for many different approaches to pre-deployment training. Lieutenant General Thomas Metz, in preparing the Army’s III Corps headquarters staff personnel for duty in Iraq as part of Multi-National Corps – Iraq, sent senior officers to Jordan for lessons on the history and culture of the Middle East as part of their pre-deployment preparation. Additionally, LTG Metz secured the services of Arabic-speaking role players to add realism to exercises at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California and at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana.

One of the more innovative approaches was developed by the 4th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division based at Fort Lewis, Washington. This unit, which returned to its home station in June 2008 after a year in Iraq, put about 80 of its soldiers through a 10-month pre-deployment

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package of Arabic instruction called the “Language Enabled Soldier (LES)” program. Most of these soldiers had deployed to Iraq at least once previously, and the commander, Colonel Jon Lehr, assessed that the risks inherent in their missing the brigade’s tactical training in preparation for the deployment were offset by the potential benefits. The LES program was subsequently adopted by the 5th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, which is scheduled to deploy to Iraq in spring 2009 and has 125 soldiers studying Arabic. When asked whether the LES program was being considered as a model for other units deploying to Iraq, the Department of the Army Senior Language Authority explained that commanders are given wide latitude in developing their pre-deployment training and that the Army was not considering making language training mandatory.

General James Mattis, upon returning from the initial invasion of Iraq as the Commanding General of the 1st Marine Division, augmented the pre-deployment language training for the next rotation of the Division with a contract, supported by Berlitz, providing four weeks of basic Arabic language and cultural instruction for 200 Marines, or about one per platoon. Like the two Army commanders, General Mattis saw language and cultural ability as a force multiplier. It was General Mattis’ view that, “Having someone who can speak Arabic is like having another infantry battalion.”

While anecdotal, these experiences could be instructive. The Subcommittee understands the desirability of allowing commanders flexibility in tailoring their pre-deployment training according to individual circumstances. However, given that training for units deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan typically follows a structured regimen, we question why these lessons have not been institutionalized, providing models for the future. Additionally, we note that the Services do not appear to be tracking those service members who have completed the above mentioned training. Consequently, the Services should consider including this data in their personnel management databases in order to ensure that they receive the full benefit of this investment throughout a member’s career.

60 Longo, briefing to HASC O&I Subcommittee staff.
Having someone who can speak Arabic is like having another infantry battalion.

General James Mattis
Former Commanding General, 1st Marine Division

While the nation as a whole lacks a broad commitment to the study of languages and other cultures, there are specific, significant costs and risks associated with the military’s present and historic shortfall in language and cultural skills. The importance of these skills may be more obvious in the irregular warfare setting, but are as important in the more traditional combat arena. For example, in World War II, Private First Class (PFC) Guy Gabaldon, with even a limited ability to speak Japanese, was able to singlehandedly convince over 1,500 Japanese soldiers to surrender on Saipan. PFC Gabaldon’s feat is all the more remarkable given the common understanding at the time that efforts to convince Japanese troops to surrender would be fruitless. The impact of PFC Gabaldon’s heroic efforts cannot be overstated. Not only did he save over 1,500 Japanese, his efforts to prevent further combat also saved untold numbers of American lives, again showing the importance language skills can play.

The Coalition Forces’ experiences in Iraq demonstrate the significant military requirement for foreign language and cultural expertise across the full spectrum of operations. In the first year of operations, the ready availability of Arabic language skills almost certainly would have better positioned commanders to take fuller advantage of important intelligence from captured prisoners and documents that might have identified earlier the potential for the emergence of an insurgency. And importantly, with language skills and cultural awareness, the Coalition could have better communicated its positive intentions, throughout its operations, directly to the population, thereby making its counterinsurgency efforts much more effective.

Viewed through the lens of the Afghanistan and Iraq experiences, it is worth noting that the shortfall in language skills and cultural awareness is not limited to the military, but extends to other agencies in the federal government. The national security establishment’s overall unpreparedness to meet the demand for language speakers with even a limited ability and its belated and limited understanding of the Iraq and Afghanistan cultures has greatly increased the costs and risks involved in those operations. Greater numbers of military and civilian personnel, and just as importantly, members of the local communities have been exposed to increased risk of injury or death in these conflicts. The costs to the nation greatly increased as operations in Iraq mired down, when an unanticipated, but arguably predictable

1 Rick Rogers, “Marines Learning Iraqi Customs, Language Before Deployment,” The San Diego Union (12 September 2007). Accessed online at:
insurgency emerged. While issues in Afghanistan are multi-faceted, one can still argue that a better understanding of Afghan culture and history would have enhanced the ability of Coalition Forces to win over the population.

As the Services develop language and cultural capabilities in the force, they will need to balance additional time for this training with the impact on overall readiness. The risk to readiness must be assessed as other forms of training including shooting on the firing range or flying in simulators are scaled back to accommodate these new requirements. Maintenance of language proficiency would also impose significant cost beyond initial language training throughout a service member’s career. In addition, depending on the scope of what the Department hopes to achieve, new infrastructure to support language and cultural training may be needed, including classrooms, technology, and instructors which may impact the availability of this infrastructure for other more traditional training.

It is difficult to predict the exact price tag for developing needed language and cultural capabilities. However, we do know what the cost to the military and the nation is if we continue to fail to greatly enhance these skills. The risk is more conflict and prolonged conflict, and the cost is more lives needlessly lost on all sides.
ADDRESSING THE LARGER CHALLENGE

It's interesting, isn't it, that the State Department and the Defense Department are sponsoring a language initiative. It says something about the world we live in. I felt certain that the Secretary of Education would be here. After all, we're talking about education. And I want to thank you for being here, Margaret [Spelling]. But I also find it's interesting you're sitting next to John Negroponte, who is the Director of National Intelligence.

President George W. Bush
Remarks by the President to the U.S. University Presidents Summit on International Education, Introducing the National Security Language Initiative
January 5, 2006

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WORK WITH STATES, UNIVERSITIES, AND OTHER AGENCIES

In addition to the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap and the Services’ initiatives, the Department has been involved, for some time, in addressing a larger challenge. The nation, as a whole, lacks an educational infrastructure that can produce the dramatically increased numbers of highly proficient individuals needed, not only for national security, but also for economic competitiveness. Moreover, the nation’s educational system has yet to fully recognize the importance of foreign language and cultural studies in our increasingly globalized world. As a consequence, the Department finds itself involved in programs aimed at increasing the availability of foreign language study opportunities for both its personnel and members of the U.S. public. DOD’s rationale is that if foreign language training becomes an integral part of the U.S. educational system, starting in kindergarten and continuing through advanced graduate work, the Department will have a greater and more sophisticated recruiting pool for service members, civilians, and contractors to meet expected national security challenges.

The Department has developed and implemented its own programs, such as the National Security Education Program (NSEP), the Flagship Initiative, and the National Language Service Corps (NLSC). It has also participated in programs, like the White House’s 2006 National Security Language Initiative (NSLI), with other federal agencies, including the Departments of Education and State, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

1 Hon. George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President to the U.S. University Presidents Summit on International Education Introducing the National Security Language Initiative” (5 January 2006).
NATIONAL SECURITY LANGUAGE INITIATIVE

The National Security Language Initiative is a loose grouping of largely preexisting programs in the Departments of Defense, Education, State, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Ostensibly, these programs are “coordinated” by the White House; however, there is no specific office that performs this function. In reality, rather than a comprehensive program, the initiative is more of a collection of efforts by the four federal agencies to achieve the following broad goals:

♦ Increasing the number of U.S. residents studying critical need languages and starting them at an earlier age;

♦ Increasing the number of advanced-level speakers of foreign languages, with an emphasis on mastery of critical-need languages; and

♦ Increasing the number of teachers of critical-need languages and providing resources for them.

The Language Flagship Initiative and the NLSC are the two Department of Defense programs that are part of the NSLI. Both of these programs are funded under the National Security Education Program.

NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION PROGRAM (NSEP)

NSEP is a partnership between the national security community and higher education to address national needs for expertise in critical languages and regions. Based on lessons learned from Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM, the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (NSEA) authorized a program of financial assistance for international education and foreign language studies by American undergraduate and graduate students. NSEA provides three types of funding: (a) scholarships for undergraduate students to study in a "critical" foreign country; (b) grants to institutions of higher education to establish or operate programs in "critical" foreign language and area studies overseas; and (c) fellowships for graduate students for education abroad or in the United States in "critical" foreign languages, disciplines, and area studies.

Individuals who receive NSEP fellowships and scholarships are obligated for a limited period of time to seek employment in a national security position, or if, after a "good faith" effort, they are unsuccessful in obtaining such positions, they can fulfill the requirement through work in the field of higher education in an area of study for which the scholarship

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3 Ibid.
was awarded.\textsuperscript{5} For some, working in a government position is a challenge because of security clearance issues. The Department, as a whole, has apparently not had great success in hiring NSEP Fellows. The Language Flagship and the National Language Service Corps, discussed below, are also administered under the NSEP in the Department of Defense.\textsuperscript{6}

The essential task of increasing our Nation’s foreign language skills and cultural understanding will be accomplished primarily at the state and local level. Nonetheless, this task requires guidance and incentives from the Federal level.

\textit{A Call to Action for National Foreign Language Capabilities}
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
Department of Defense
February 1, 2005\textsuperscript{7}

\textbf{THE LANGUAGE FLAGSHIP INITIATIVE}

Administered under the National Security Education Program, the Flagship Initiative actually predates the National Security Language Initiative (NSLI). The Language Flagship began in 1991 as a small pilot project to challenge a few U.S. universities to build programs for advanced language education. One primary reason was to increase the pool of potential military and government recruits with language ability. The Flagship also aimed to build national capacity by increasing the pool of language teachers. The first Flagship grants were awarded in 2002 to institutions which sponsored Flagship “centers” on their campuses. Initially, the languages chosen were Korean, Arabic, Russian, and Chinese, but there are now centers for Turkish, Hindi, Urdu, and Farsi. Presently, the Flagship community consists of 12 Flagship Centers at institutions of higher education and three experimental K-12 programs.\textsuperscript{8} The Department reports that additional schools wishing to participate in the Flagship Initiative, including four new schools this year, are being paired with an existing program mentor to develop their curriculum.\textsuperscript{9} Using a combination of intensive campus curriculum and overseas immersion, the Flagship programs strive to produce students at a “superior” proficiency level in one of the critical languages.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{5} Foreign Language and International Studies: Federal Aid Under Title VI of the Higher Education Act, CRS, 15.
  \item \textsuperscript{6} Preliminary Results of the National Security Language Initiative, 15.
  \item \textsuperscript{7} A Call to Action for National Foreign Language Capabilities, The National Language Conference (1 February 2005).
  \item \textsuperscript{8} Some Centers focus on undergraduate programs only, others also include post-BA programs, and 3 have K-12 programs (the Ohio State, Oregon, and Michigan State universities). Also, some have responsibility for overseeing the overseas immersion component of the program. The highest level of funding is about $800,000 a year – the minimum level is about $250,000.
  \item \textsuperscript{9} Dr. Robert Slater, Director, National Security Education Program, Department of Defense. Statement before the U.S. House, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, hearing on “DOD’s Work with States, Universities, and Students to Transform the Nation’s Foreign Language Capacity” (Washington, D.C.: 23 September 2008).
\end{itemize}
In 2007, under the auspices of the Flagship Initiative, the Department worked with the states of Ohio, Oregon, and Texas to convene language “summits.” These events brought together educators, officials from state and local governments, and leaders from the corporate sector. The Flagship Centers at The Ohio State University, the University of Oregon, and the University of Texas at Austin took part in this effort. The six-month project culminated with the publication of state language roadmaps for Ohio, Oregon, and Texas. The roadmaps are strategic plans for K-16 language education.\(^\text{10}\) The Department’s sponsorship of the state roadmap development effort was a one-time event and was funded for only one year. Witnesses at Subcommittee hearings applauded these efforts and suggested that roadmaps be crafted for all 50 states and the District of Columbia. They noted, however, that this larger roadmap effort should be conducted with Department of Education rather than DOD funds.\(^\text{11}\)

**NATIONAL LANGUAGE SERVICE CORPS**

The second Department of Defense program grouped under the NSLI is the National Language Service Corps, which aims to establish a 1,000-person cadre of highly proficient foreign language speakers by 2010, who will be available to federal agencies in time of need.\(^\text{12}\) Currently, this is a pilot program that began recruiting in January 2008 for speakers of Marshallese, Mandarin, Hindi, Vietnamese, Indonesian, Russian, Hausa, Swahili, and Somali.\(^\text{13}\) It envisions utilizing volunteers as on-call federal employees in domestic and international crises. The NLSC will conduct assessments and certify the language skill proficiency levels of its members. The NLSC is structured into two “pools”: (1) a National Pool which provides language expertise for short-term problems that do not require job-related training to support a specific organization, and (2) a Dedicated Sponsor Pool, whose members provide recurring support to a specific federal agency.

The Department is planning NLSC activation exercises with other federal agencies. During each exercise, the Department plans to alert 100 members, activate 50, and deploy 5 as part of an interagency team.\(^\text{14}\) The first activation exercise is planned for February 2009 with the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta and will test responding to an environmental emergency somewhere in the United States.\(^\text{15}\) Volunteers from both pools will be considered for activation. A second exercise, which is planned for the U.S. Pacific Command, will activate Corps members and deploy them overseas. This activation exercise will tie into a previously-planned exercise there. NSEP is funding NLSC participation in both exercises.

\(^\text{10}\) Preliminary Results of the National Security Language Initiative, 16.
\(^\text{13}\) Slater, HASC Statement (23 September 2008), 18.
\(^\text{14}\) Ibid., 22.
\(^\text{15}\) Ibid.
NATIONAL LANGUAGE CONFERENCE, “A CALL TO ACTION”

In June 2004, the Department of Defense hosted the National Language Conference at the University of Maryland, along with the Departments of State and Education and the Intelligence Community. Over 300 leaders representing federal, state, and local government agencies, business and industry, academic institutions, foreign language interest groups, and foreign nations attended the conference. In February 2005, the Department of Defense published a white paper, A Call to Action for National Foreign Language Capabilities, as a result of the conference.

The Department hoped that the white paper would advance a national agenda to promote the nation’s global leadership by increasing foreign language proficiency and by building understanding and respect for other cultures. The white paper asserts that the essential task of increasing foreign language skills and cultural understanding must be accomplished at the state and local level. It also supports the establishment of a National Language Authority, which would advocate, coordinate, and collaborate with state and local governments, academia, and the private sector, to enhance the nation’s foreign language and cultural understanding capabilities. The white paper further argues for a National Language Coordination Council, which would identify priorities, develop a national foreign language strategy, coordinate the strategy’s implementation across all sectors, alert the nation’s leaders to the gravity of the current foreign language gap, and increase public awareness, among other things.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SCHOOLS

Overall, the Department does not appear to be placing a particular emphasis on producing proficient foreign language students in the primary and secondary school system it has the most direct ability to affect. The Department of Defense operates two school systems for service members’ children, one overseas, the other domestic, in which it has introduced some enhanced foreign language programs. The Department of Defense Education Activity (DODEA) currently supports traditional middle and high school foreign language courses as well as three elementary school foreign language programs. The three elementary school programs include Foreign Language in the Elementary School (FLES), host nation

1 A Call to Action for National Foreign Language Capabilities, 5.
4 A Call to Action for National Foreign Language Capabilities, 5.
familiarization (overseas schools only), and partial immersion classrooms. For high school students, a minimum of two years study of a single foreign language is required for graduation.

**PENDING LEGISLATION**

The House and Senate Armed Services Committees have included numerous provisions regarding language training and skills in annual defense legislation, and many more proposals have been introduced by others in Congress. The 110th Congress is no exception, having introduced a number of proposals concerning the larger issue of foreign language learning in the United States. For example, Representative Rush Holt introduced the “National Security Language Act” on January 24, 2007. Mr. Holt’s bill would amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA) by establishing programs to encourage early foreign language instruction. Representative Brian Baird and Senator Daniel Akaka introduced the “National Foreign Language Coordination Act” on January 31, 2007. Their legislation would establish a National Foreign Language Coordination Council, in the Executive Office of the President, similar to that suggested in DOD’s white paper, *A Call to Action for National Foreign Language Capabilities*, to: (1) oversee and implement the National Security Language Initiative, and (2) develop and implement a national foreign language strategy. This proposal was included in the Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, but was not adopted in conference. Congresswoman Loretta Sanchez introduced another legislative proposal, “The United States and the World Act,” on September 22, 2008. This legislation would provide $225 million annually in new federal funding for professional development of prospective, future, and in-service teachers in foreign language and international studies.

As these programs suggest, the Department is playing a role in a larger effort to increase foreign language, regional expertise, and cultural awareness skills and training in the broader U.S. population on the theory that this will contribute to the availability of a more skilled future workforce of potential service members, civilian employees, and contractors. The Subcommittee questions, however, whether the Department could get greater return on its investments. The Department should find better ways to attract its NSEP Fellows for employment in the Department, both to fulfill their service commitment and to place them in a career path that uses their language skills. We also question whether the Department should place greater emphasis on critical language and culture programs in its own school system. We recognize that the Department has some advanced language programs in place, but the Department could create programs in its schools that could serve as a model elsewhere. Finally, the Reserve Officer Training Corps Language and Culture Project, also a part of NSEP discussed earlier, appears to be another opportunity in which the Department could accomplish more by targeting its largest feeder schools, including, in particular, the senior military colleges.

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20 The bill was referred to the House Armed Services Committee, the House Intelligence (Permanent Select) Committee, and the Education and Labor Committee. The House Intelligence (Permanent Select) Committee has generally been very supportive of increasing funding for foreign language programs like NSEP.
FINDINGS AND ISSUES FOR FURTHER STUDY

We recognize that this is a highly complex endeavor that will require continuing oversight. Based upon our work, since June, the Subcommittee makes the following findings and suggests additional issues for further study.

FINDINGS

WHAT IS DOD TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH?

1. DOD has set an ambitious vision at the strategic level in identifying foreign language, regional expertise, and cultural awareness as critical warfighting skills and core competencies for the force.

2. For the most part, the Department does not yet have a true understanding of the combatant commands’ operational requirements in a way that best enables the Services to organize, train, and equip the force to include needed skills and capabilities.

3. Similarly, the Department has not yet established a capabilities-based process for identifying emerging requirements 10-15 years into the future.

WHAT IS THE MILITARY REQUIREMENT?

1. Even without the COCOM requirements and a process to identify future emerging requirements, the Services have undertaken a number of initiatives related to foreign language skills, cultural awareness, and regional expertise.

2. There is general agreement in DOD that the requirements process has to be refined in order for the Services to develop a force that supports the COCOMs’ operational needs for language skills and regional expertise and future emerging needs.

HOW IS DOD TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH THE GOAL?

1. Although the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap tasks are reportedly close to 90% complete, it is clear that transformation of the force is just beginning. OSD and the Joint Staff are taking additional actions to continue the transformation effort.
2. The Services are also taking a number of actions, but it is not clear whether the sum total of those actions will be truly transformational for the general purpose forces.
   ♦ They may be more transformational with respect to cultural awareness.
   ♦ They appear to be less transformational with respect to establishing the kind of “foundational language expertise” contemplated in the Department’s vision and articulated in the Roadmap.

3. The Services’ capabilities would be enhanced if the nation’s K-16 educational programs increased emphasis on language and cultural programs.

4. NSEP has not necessarily focused on DOD schools or ROTC programs at the largest feeder schools, where it should have the most influence.

WHAT ARE THE COSTS AND RISKS?

1. The national security establishment’s overall unpreparedness to meet the demand for language speakers with even a limited ability and its belated and limited understanding of culture has greatly increased the costs and risks involved in current operations.

2. Language and cultural capabilities are critical, not just for irregular warfare missions, but across the entire spectrum of operations, including more traditional combat operations.

3. As the Services develop language and cultural capabilities in the force, they will need to balance the new demands for proficiency in language and culture and the maintenance of these new capabilities with the requirements for training in more traditional combat skills.

ISSUES FOR FURTHER STUDY

1. What is the relative importance the Department and the Services place on language abilities in the officer corps and how do their promotion and assignment policies reflect that?

2. The Department’s policy explicitly requires, and the Services routinely provide, pre-deployment language and cultural awareness training to units deploying overseas. How do the Services intend to measure language, regional expertise, and cultural awareness capabilities and what is the relationship between that measurement and a unit’s overall readiness assessment? Any such study should also examine what testing process the Services intend to use for assessing cultural awareness.

3. The marked increase in the demand for more basic language skill levels will require the Department to develop a test designed specifically to evaluate proficiency for the general purpose forces. The Department’s current tests are not suitable because they are structured
to measure the more advanced proficiency of the language professionals. How does the Department intend to test lower level language skills?

4. The Subcommittee expects that a GAO report at the end of this year will highlight areas for further congressional oversight. There should be a robust review of COCOM programs, efforts, and requirements; the Services’ new language and culture centers; and the GAO report’s recommendations.

5. DOD will produce the report required by Section 958 of the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act in February 2009. It will likely show a significant shortfall of personnel to fill the language-coded billets at any level. How will DOD address this issue?

6. How will DOD determine the best source for needed language, cultural awareness, and regional expertise, including military or civilian personnel, contractors, a civilian linguist reserve corps, allies and coalition partners, technological solutions, reach-back assistance for document translation and interpreting services, and cultural advice from the Human Terrain System?

7. How will the Services’ FAO and FAO-like programs be improved?

8. Are differences among the Services’ policies for Foreign Language Proficiency Bonus Pay appropriate, particularly with respect to special operations forces and civilians? Should there be a more standardized approach?

9. What is the direct benefit of the National Security Language Initiative to DOD? Should DOD be making a larger or smaller contribution to the NSLI? What can be done by Congress to energize this program for the interagency? Should there be a White House office like the Office of Science and Technology Policy or an organization like the National Science Foundation for language and culture promotion in the states and among other agencies?

10. Is there a need for a robust review of language, regional, and cultural courses and requirements in officer and enlisted Professional Military Education (PME), from accessions to the War Colleges, and including the four regional centers’ contributions?

11. What impact is the security clearance process having on the Department’s ability to increase the number of personnel with foreign language skills and regional expertise generally and, in particular, with respect to NSEP Fellows and native or heritage speakers?
GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

The Subcommittee believes that the following recommendations would begin to address what appears to be a degree of inconsistency between what the Department envisions for the future and what the Services are doing.

1. DOD should clarify its policy characterizing foreign language, regional expertise, and cultural awareness as critical or core competencies essential to DOD missions.

2. Beyond the Roadmap, DOD should develop a comprehensive foreign language, cultural awareness, and regional expertise strategy that includes a prioritization of efforts and resources.

3. DOD should address the deficiencies in the requirements generation process for the combatant commands’ operational needs, and it should establish a process for identifying emerging and future capability requirements.

4. The Services should use a secondary occupational code or special experience identifier for personnel who, while not language professionals, have validated language training/skills or regional expertise. This data would then be available within the Services’ personnel and manpower databases to be used by commanders for making assignments.

5. The Department should consider targeting its ROTC Language and Culture Project grants toward its largest feeder schools, such as the five senior military colleges, to develop critical language programs at those schools that are developing the greatest number of officers.

6. Where the Services otherwise have not, they should begin to require that ROTC cadets and midshipmen study a foreign language, preferably the less commonly taught languages.

7. The Department should improve its program to place NSEP Fellows in appropriate positions in the Department to fulfill their service commitments. Furthermore, the Department should work to provide employment opportunities for these fellows in a career path that uses their critical skills.

8. The Department should place greater emphasis on critical language and cultural programs in its own K-12 school system to make these a model for producing students with higher proficiency levels in critical languages.

9. The Services should ensure that, aside from the heritage and native speaker programs, their recruiters and human resources communities understand the importance the Department attaches to recruiting personnel with language abilities and regional/cultural expertise, empowering them to maintain proficiency throughout their careers, and placing them in assignments where those skills can be best utilized.
CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that foreign language skills and cultural expertise are critical capabilities needed by today’s military to face the challenges of our present security environment. But, only a small part of our military is proficient in a foreign language and until recently there has been no comprehensive, systematic approach to develop cultural skills. The military’s lack of language skills and cultural expertise is a symptom of the larger problem facing the nation as a whole. Our educational system does not place a priority on, and lacks the infrastructure to support, the widespread teaching of foreign languages, not to mention the less commonly taught languages needed by today’s force.

The Department and the Services are undertaking a number of efforts, but we question whether they consider these skills to be as important as critical weapon systems, as stated in the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap. We will begin to believe that “transformation,” to use the Department’s word, has occurred when, for example, language and cultural capabilities play a greater role in promotions, when unit readiness measures these skills, and when training in these skills takes place as early as recruit training alongside traditional warfighting skills, such as qualifying on the rifle range. As a first step, the Services’ strategies for developing language and cultural skills should better align with the Department’s vision for creating foundational language and cultural expertise.

Just as important as the changes that the military needs to make to its mindset, the nation’s school systems need to change their overall approach as well. The nation’s schools must develop K-16 programs that routinely graduate students with advanced proficiency levels, by, for example, establishing immersion programs that begin in kindergarten and continue throughout a student’s scholastic career, and developing the teachers and curricula to support this effort.

As much as this report has focused on the Department’s response to this challenge and the need for a new approach by the nation’s schools, Congress recognizes that it too has a responsibility in this endeavor. This year, Congress, at the Department’s request, significantly increased funding for the Defense Language Program, but it did not fund the entire requested amount. Similarly Congress has supported some funding for the Department of Education’s National Security Language Initiative (NSLI) programs, but has not provided funding for several others. The next Congress should carefully examine future budget requests in this area, and the Executive Branch should clearly identify these programs’ priority.

While the Department may be able to make inroads in addressing language and cultural skills shortfalls, without Congressional support and a dramatic change in the nation’s prioritization of language and cultural learning, the Department of Defense will continue to face great difficulty in surmounting this enormous challenge.
**APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAOCL</td>
<td>Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning</td>
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<td>CDC</td>
<td>Centers for Disease Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLREC</td>
<td>Center for Language, Regional Expertise and Culture</td>
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<tr>
<td>COCOMs</td>
<td>Combatant Commands</td>
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<td>CRS</td>
<td>Congressional Research Service</td>
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<td>DARPA</td>
<td>Defense Advanced Research Project Agency</td>
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<td>DLI</td>
<td>Defense Language Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DODEA</td>
<td>Department of Defense Education Agency</td>
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<td>ESL</td>
<td>English as a Second Language</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Foreign Area Officer</td>
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<td>FLES</td>
<td>Foreign Language in the Elementary School</td>
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<td>FLPB</td>
<td>Foreign Language Proficiency Bonus</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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<td>GAO</td>
<td>Government Accountability Office</td>
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<td>HEA</td>
<td>Higher Education Act</td>
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<td>HTT</td>
<td>Human Terrain Team</td>
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<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<tr>
<td>IIE</td>
<td>Institute of International Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILR</td>
<td>Interagency Language Roundtable</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIEDDO</td>
<td>Joint Improvised Explosive Device Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>LREC</td>
<td>Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Awareness</td>
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<td>MLA</td>
<td>Military Legislative Assistant</td>
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<td>NDAA</td>
<td>National Defense Authorization Act</td>
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<td>NLSC</td>
<td>National Language Service Corps</td>
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<td>NSEA</td>
<td>National Security Education Act</td>
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<td>NSEP</td>
<td>National Security Education Program</td>
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<td>NSLI</td>
<td>National Security Language Initiative</td>
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<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>United States Pacific Command</td>
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<td>PEP</td>
<td>Proficiency Enhancement Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFC</td>
<td>Private First Class</td>
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<td>PME</td>
<td>Professional Military Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAO</td>
<td>Regional Area Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROTC</td>
<td>Reserve Officer Training Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAIC</td>
<td>Science Applications International Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLA</td>
<td>Senior Language Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Southern Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSTR</td>
<td>Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Training and Doctrine Command Culture Center</td>
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APPENDIX B: HEARINGS, BRIEFINGS, INTERVIEWS

HEARINGS:


Dr. Richard Brecht
Executive Director
Center for Advanced Study of Language
University of Maryland

Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.
President
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

Dr. Montgomery McFate
Senior Social Science Advisor
Joint Advanced Warfighting Division
Institute for Defense Analyses

Dr. Amy Zalman
Policy Analyst
Science Applications International Corporation

“Transforming the U.S. Military’s Foreign Language, Cultural Awareness, and Regional Expertise Capabilities” September 10, 2008

Mrs. Gail H. McGinn
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Plans)
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)

Brigadier General Gary Patton, USA
Senior Language Authority
Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff/J-1

Brigadier General R.M. (Dick) Lake, USMC
Director of Intelligence
U.S. Marine Corps

Rear Admiral Daniel P. Holloway, USN
Director, Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division (OPNAV N13)
U.S. Navy

Mr. Joseph M. McDade, Jr.
Director, Force Development
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Personnel
U.S. Air Force

Brigadier General Richard Longo, USA
Director of Training, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7
U.S. Army
“DOD’s Work with States, Universities, and Students to Transform the Nation’s Foreign Language Capacity”

Dr. Robert O. Slater
Director, National Security Education Program
Department of Defense

Dr. Dana Bourgerie
Associate Professor of Chinese
Director, Chinese Flagship Center
Brigham Young University

Dr. Terri E. Givens
Frank C. Erwin, Jr. Centennial Honors Professor
Vice Provost
The University of Texas at Austin

Dr. Galal Walker
Professor of Chinese
Director, National East Asian Languages Resource Center and Chinese Flagship Center
The Ohio State University

**MEMBER BRIEFINGS:**

Discussion with Dr. David S.C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness”

**STAFF BRIEFINGS AND MEETINGS:**

Dr. Robert O. Slater, Director, National Security Education Program, DOD
Colonel Sandusky, Defense Language Institute
Dr. Patrick Cronin, Director, NDU Institute for National Strategic Studies
GAO Briefing on DOD Language/Cultural Awareness Capabilities
BG Richard Longo, USA Senior Language Authority, and MG Gregory Schumacher, USA, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2
Mr. Joseph McDade, USAF, Director, Force Development, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Personnel
Mr. Mark Neighbors, USN Deputy Senior Language Authority
Mr. Jack Donnelly, Director, Special Operations Foreign Language Office
Ms. Ava Marlow-Hage, Mr. Raoul Vicencio, J-1 Foreign Language Program Office
Ambassador Michael Lemmon (Ret.), The Flagship Group
BGen R.M. Lake, USMC, Director of Intelligence
Betsi Shays, Director, National Security Language Initiative
BG Patton, Joint Staff Senior Language Authority
Dr. William Berry, Distinguished Research Fellow, Center for Technology and National Security Policy
GAO Briefing on Foreign Language Transformation
STAFF TRAVEL:

Staffdel Fenner to U.S. Pacific Command, Defense Language Institute, and the Naval Postgraduate School
Staffdel DeTeresa to MCB Quantico, Virginia
Staffdel Fenner to U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Central Command, and Joint Interagency Task Force-South

June 29 – July 3, 2008

July 18, 2008

APPENDIX C: SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS


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___ Letter to The Honorable Carl Levin. 8 July 2007.
___ Letter to the Honorable Duncan Hunter. 8 July 2006.
___ Letter to The Honorable Ike Skelton. 8 July 2007.


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DEFENSE LANGUAGE TRANSFORMATION ROADMAP

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Reading/Listening/Speaking. Address Language Requirements
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Promotion Rates of Military Personnel with Language Skills
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DEFENSE LANGUAGE TRANSFORMATION ROADMAP

INTRODUCTION

Post 9/11 military operations reinforce the reality that the Department of Defense needs a significantly improved organic capability in emerging languages and dialects, a greater competence and regional area skills in those languages and dialects, and a surge capability to rapidly expand its language capabilities on short notice.

The Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) for FY 2006-2011 directed the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD (P&R)) to develop and provide to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DepSecDef), a comprehensive roadmap for achieving the full range of language capabilities necessary to support the 2004 Defense Strategy. The SPG established four goals for language transformation:

1. Create foundational language and cultural expertise in the officer, civilian, and enlisted ranks for both Active and Reserve Components.

2. Create the capacity to surge language and cultural resources beyond these foundational and in-house capabilities.

3. Establish a cadre of language specialists possessing a level 3/3/3 ability (reading/listening/speaking ability).

4. Establish a process to track the accession, separation and promotion rates of language professionals and Foreign Area Officers (FAOs).

BACKGROUND

The Roadmap was built upon the results of a series of actions taken within the Department over the last two years.

♦ In November 2002, USD (P&R) directed each Military Department, Combatant Command (COCOM), and Defense Agency to review its requirements for language professionals, including interpreters, translators, crypto-linguists, interrogators, and area specialists, including enlisted, officer, and civilian personnel. The review resulted in narrowly scoped requirements based on current manning authorizations instead of requirements based upon recent operational experience and projected needs.

♦ In August 2003, the USD (P&R) directed a formal review of the operations, plans,
funding, governance and physical facilities of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC). The purpose of the review was to determine whether the DLIFLC was appropriately tasked, configured, resourced, operated and managed to meet the needs of the Department. The study articulated the needs for qualitative improvement in language skills of graduates and robust support to other Defense Components; i.e., beyond the Intelligence Community.

♦ In September 2003, the Deputy Under Secretary for Plans (DUSD (Plans)), commissioned a study of five language functions: language management within the COCOMs; management of Foreign Area Officers (FAO) within the Services; development of foreign language and regional knowledge in the officer corps; management of language personnel; and requirements determination processes for assessing language needs. The Roadmap builds upon the study recommendations.

♦ During January-July 2004, DUSD (Plans) assembled a Defense Language Transformation Team (DLTT) with representatives from the Military Departments, the National Security Agency, and the United States Special Operations Command (US SOCOM). The DLTT identified needed actions and laid the groundwork for Roadmap recommendations across the Department.

♦ On May 10, 2004, DepSecDef directed USD (P&R) to appoint a DoD Senior Language Authority (SLA) and further directed the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the COCOMs, and the Directors of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency each to appoint an SLA at the General/Flag Officer or Senior Executive Service or equivalent. The SLAs are responsible for assessing the organization’s language needs, tracking language assets assigned to the organization and identifying emerging policy requirements.

♦ In this same memo, DepSecDef also directed the creation of a Defense Foreign Language Steering Committee (DFLSC) comprised of SLAs from the Services, Joint Staff, COCOMs and Defense Agencies in order to provide senior level guidance in the language transformation effort and future development of the Department’s language capabilities. The Under Secretaries of Defense (Comptroller), (Policy), and (Intelligence) were also asked to appoint members to the DFLSC.

From June through August 2004, the DFLSC oversaw the development of this Roadmap and, on August 31, fully approved the Roadmap’s assumptions, descriptions of the current situation, desired outcomes, and recommendations. Upon coordination, the recommendations became required actions. The DFLSC will assist the DoD SLA in overseeing the implementation of the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap and
report progress to the USD (P&R) via recommended performance measures.

THE ROADMAP

Assumptions

♦ Conflict against enemies speaking less-commonly-taught languages and thus the need for foreign language capability will not abate. Robust foreign language and foreign area expertise are critical to sustaining coalitions, pursuing regional stability, and conducting multi-national missions especially in post-conflict and other than combat, security, humanitarian, nation-building, and stability operations.

♦ Changes in the international security environment and in the nature of threats to US national security have increased the range of potential conflict zones and expanded the number of likely coalition partners with whom US forces will work.

♦ Establishing a new “global footprint” for DoD, and transitioning to a more expeditionary force, will bring increased requirements for language and regional knowledge to work with new coalition partners in a wide variety of activities, often with little or no notice. This new approach to warfighting in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century will require forces that have foreign language capabilities beyond those generally available in today’s force.

♦ Adversaries will attempt to manipulate the media and leverage sympathetic elements of the population and “opposition” politicians to divide international coalitions.

Strategic Planning Guidance Goals, Current Situations, Desired Outcomes, and Required Actions

Goal 1. Create Foundational Language and Regional Area Expertise.

Current Situation: Language skill and regional expertise have not been regarded as warfighting skills, and are not sufficiently incorporated into operational or contingency planning. As a result, there is insufficient effort under the current “requirements” determination process to prepare for support of deployed forces. Much language talent resident in the force (Active and Reserve Components, and civilians) is unknown and untapped. Language skill and regional expertise are not valued as Defense core competencies yet they are as important as critical weapon systems.
Desired Outcomes:

♦ The Department has personnel with language skills capable of responding as needed for peacetime and wartime operations with the correct levels of proficiency.

♦ The total force understands and values the tactical, operational, and strategic asset inherent in regional expertise and language.

♦ Regional area education is incorporated into Professional Military Education and Development.

Required Actions:
Please note: All required actions are subject to requirements of law; e.g., the Privacy Act and non-discrimination provisions, and coordination across policy proponents.

1.A. Establish a Language Office within USD (P&R). The Defense Language Office (established within the Defense Human Resources Activity) will ensure a strategic focus on meeting present and future requirements for language and regional expertise. This office will establish and oversee policy regarding the development, maintenance, and utilization of language capabilities; monitor trends in the promotion, accession and retention of individuals with these critical skills; and explore innovative concepts to expand capabilities. OPR: USD (P&R) FOC: May 2005

1.B. Revise the Defense Language Program Directive (DoDD 5160.41). The Directive will update Defense Language Program (DLP) policy and establish responsibilities for management of the DLP, given the lessons of current operations and the Global War on Terrorism. It will permanently establish SLAs and the DLSC as directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. It will reinvigorate the Defense Language Program (DLP) to maximize the accession, development, and employment of individuals with language skills. OPR: USD (P&R) FOC: July 2005

1.C. Publish a DoD Instruction providing guidance for language program management. This instruction will provide further implementing details of the Defense Language Program, including guidance on providing language instruction, testing, determination of required capability, technical qualifications, integration of technology solutions, and may include utilization of non-DoD language program services. OPR: USD (P&R) FOC: June 2006

1.D. Ensure Doctrine, policies, and planning guidance reflect the need for language requirements in operational, contingency, and stabilization planning. Doctrine,
policies and planning guidance will reflect the need for deliberately planned operational and contingency language support. Assess Joint and Service doctrine for inclusion of language requirements to meet this goal. Upon completion of assessment, ensure required changes are included in the creation or revision of appropriate Joint and Service Doctrinal publications. OPR: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretaries of the Military Departments FOC: March 2006

1.E. Require COCOMs to identify linguistic and translator requirements as part of their contingency and deliberate planning processes for operations and plans. This will provide needed visibility on anticipated requirements prior to the execution of operations. OPR: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff FOC: September 2005

1.F. Build a capabilities-based language requirement determination process. In order to obtain a true picture of language needs, this process will be a zero-based, systematic, and comprehensive process that identifies and validates language and regional expertise requirements in DoD, based upon national security strategy documents including the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Security Cooperation Guidance, as well as contingency and operational planning. OPR: USD (P), Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff FOC: March 2006

1.G. Publish a “strategic language list” annually. This list will use the annual policy and strategy review provided by the Under Secretary of Defense, Policy, and will outline prioritized languages for which DoD has current and projected requirements and for which training and testing will be provided, incentives applied, and other resources allocated. This list will not preclude the DoD Components from maintaining capability and paying FLPP for other languages for which they may have requirements. This list will allow the DLIFLC to support strategic language needs and prompt the articulation of capabilities with the DoD Components and COCOMS for resources in the languages. OPR: USD (P&R), USD (P) FOC: June 2005

1.H. Develop a language readiness index. This index will measure language capabilities within Component missions and roles. It will compare the proficiency level of the language mission to the language capability of the individuals available to perform that mission, as measured by testing. Its purpose: to identify gaps in language readiness resource needs. This index will be integrated into the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS). OPR: USD (P&R) FOC: September 2005

1.I. Standardize language and regional identification codes for use across the DoD. Standard codes will ensure all Components define languages and regions in the same manner, simplifying cross-Component understanding and cooperation. OPR: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, USD (P&R) FOC: September 2005
1.J. Conduct a one-time self-report screening of all military and civilian personnel for language skills. Forward results to the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) database or the Defense Civilian Personnel Data System (DCPDS). Create the capability to periodically update this information within the DCPDS and DMDC databases. This will allow the Department to possess an accurate record of its personnel’s language capabilities. OPR: Secretaries of the Military Departments FOC: December 2005

1.K. Establish guidelines for recruiting from heritage and US populace with language capabilities. These guidelines will facilitate recruitment of those heritage communities likely to possess language capabilities the Department requires and those amenable to recruitment. USD P&R will develop guidelines by March 2005 and the Military Departments will develop a recruitment plan for officers and enlisted from heritage communities and the US populace with language skills and cultural understanding for USD P&R approval by June 2005. OPR: USD (P&R); Secretaries of the Military Departments FOC: June 2005

1.L. Support implementation of the National Flagship Language Initiative (NFLI). The NFLI programs are designed to produce university students with advanced competency in languages critical to the nation’s security. This provides a valuable pool of potential Service members and civilian employees. DoD efforts should focus on proper utilization of graduates within the Department. OPR: USD (P&R) FOC: Ongoing

1.M. Develop a recruiting plan for officers and civilians with foreign language skills in universities. Focus upon attracting university students possessing foreign language skills to DoD for duties for which these skills are required. Coordinate efforts with the National Security Education Program (NSEP). This approach will facilitate cost effective and expedient development of FAOs and language professionals. OPR: USD (P&R) FOC: November 2005

1.N. Revise current practices employed during the civilian job application process to facilitate development of a civilian language pool. Provide the opportunity for new civilian hires to identify their language skills and regional expertise in their application forms, thereby screening all personnel upon accession. Enter data on hired employees to the DCPDS to allow the Department to keep an accurate record of its personnel’s language capabilities. OPR: USD (P&R) FOC: September 2005

1.O. Improve the testing system across the DLP. OPR: Secretary of the Army* FOC: 2007

   a. To increase the pool of potential language personnel, the Department will ensure

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*As Executive Agent for the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC)
the automated Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) is available at appropriate locations, potentially including recruiters, Military Entrance Processing Stations, ROTC staff, and Service Academy staffs, to identify recruits/cadets with language learning potential at the beginning of career training. Develop guidance for administration of the DLAB. FOC: January 2007

b. Ensure availability of tests for speaking; i.e., oral proficiency interview (OPI), at any skill level. The use of OPI testing is of particular interest to USSOCOM.

Technological advances and successful speaking proficiency evaluation programs in the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the State Department, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation offer alternative approaches to current OPI practices. Review these alternatives to improve availability, timeliness, and efficiency of OPIs. Review priorities for OPI testing. FOC: October 2005

c. Implement the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) 5 as soon as possible. This will allow testing for reading and listening above Interagency Language Roundtable skill (ILR) level 3. (For civilian employees testing will be done when skill is required for job performance.) Ensure hardware and technical support are available to test control officers in order to accommodate computer based testing in concert with the implementation of DLPT 5. FOC: October 2007

1.P. Ensure incorporation of regional content in language training, professional military education and development, and pre-deployment training.
This effort will increase the number of people exposed to regional studies and help those learning a language to better understand the cultures of the people they will encounter in the region. OPR: Secretaries of the Military Departments FOC: March 2006

1.Q. Exploit "study abroad" opportunities to facilitate language acquisition.
Secretaries of the Military Departments will aggressively expand learning opportunities abroad beyond current DoD practices to expedite foreign language skill levels within the force. Hold participants accountable for learning through language proficiency tests. OPR: Secretaries of the Military Departments FOC March 2006

1.R. Establish the requirement that junior officers complete language training.
Make available one-year assignments for junior officers to serve with a foreign military or national constabulary/para-military force and reward such service via advancement. To reap the highest benefit, foreign tours of duty should match the language studied. USD (P&R) will develop a plan to implement the training requirement, assignment opportunities, and favorable consideration of language skills for advancement for Deputy Secretary of Defense approval. OPR: OSD (P&R) FOC: April 2005
1.S. Make foreign language ability a criterion for general officer/flag officer advancement. To fully implement the foreign language proficiency criterion for advancement, USD (P&R) will develop a phase-in plan for Deputy Secretary of Defense approval. OPR USD (P&R), Secretaries of the Military Departments FOC April 2005

1.T. Develop a plan to engage an interagency effort to maximize use of resources. Increase interagency efforts, such as the Defense Language Steering Committee (DLSC) and ILR, to improve cooperation and minimize duplication of effort. Encourage voluntary identification of language capability in the Federal workforce as a whole to provide a base for rapid response. OPR: USD (P&R) FOC: On-going

Goal 2: Create the Capacity to Surge.

Current Situation: Emerging critical language requirements are not being met. Current contracting practices are insufficient to meet the demand.

Desired Outcome:

- The Department of Defense has the ability to provide language and regional area expertise support to operational units when needed.

Required Actions:
Please note: All required actions are subject to requirements of law; e.g., The Privacy Act and non-discrimination provisions, and coordination across policy proponents.

2. A. Expedite the staffing and publication of a language and regional expertise operational planning tool. Issue a planning tool to COCOMs to assist in identification of required capability, resources, and planning. The planning tool will aid the integration of language and regional expertise requirements into operations, contingency, and intelligence campaign plans. OPR: USD (P&R), Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff FOC: June 2005

2.B. Improve (centralize and standardize) contract language support. Obtain Deputy Secretary of Defense appointment of a DoD Executive Agent (EA) to provide contract language support to all DoD Components. The EA’s responsibilities will include establishment of procedures for DoD Components to request and receive contract linguist support.

The EA will develop, in accordance with DoD policies, procedures for counterintelligence and security assessments of contracted linguists. Other requirements of this action include standardization of linguist pricing, prioritization of requirements,
and exemptions/waivers to the policy. This does not preclude in-theater personnel, intelligence and counterintelligence organizations, or SOCOM, from executing personal services contracts in accordance with 10 U.S.C.A 129b. OPR: USD (P&R) FOC: March 2005

2.C. Track retirees and separatees for recall or voluntary return. Develop and maintain a database containing the names of military and civilian personnel with language skills who have separated or retired from DoD. OPR: USD (P&R) FOC: September 2005

2.D. Study the need for enhancing civilian language and regional expertise in the workforce. This study will evaluate both the need and provisions for: DoD-wide professional civilian career paths for language and area specialists; uniform job descriptions based on use of language skills in task performance; language proficiency and performance compensation and incentive programs; integrated databases to facilitate identification and tracking of qualified language specialists; and a policy for sharing translation and interpretation workloads across DoD Components. OPR: USD (P&R) FOC: December 2005

2.E. Study the Army’s Pilot 09L Individual Ready Reserve program for possible DoD-wide implementation. This program recruits personnel from heritage communities to provide translation and interpretation support for military operations. OPR: USD (P&R) FOC: December 2005

2.F. Support a pilot to implement a Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps (CLRC) (subject to legislative enactment). The purpose of the CLRC is to identify, recruit and track volunteer civilian specialists with advanced proficiency in languages and who will be available to serve DoD during times of need, crisis, and/or national emergency. The January 2004 NSEP CLRC feasibility study recommended implementation of a three-year pilot program, under the DoD NSEP, to address major issues involved in the development and implementation of a CLRC. The goal of the pilot CLRC will be to further explore and test critical components of the CLRC concept through the implementation of a limited CLRC model. OPR: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (National Defense University) FOC: June 2007 (In House-side National Intelligence Director Bill, section 1056)

2.G. Develop and evaluate the concept for a Joint Service Language Corps (JSLC). Work toward creation of a joint unit of military language professionals (all Services) that any of the Services or joint organizations could use for language requirements. The JSLC could be a RC unit similar to the 300th MI Brigade or units of 09L and 97L personnel. Reservist drills would primarily center on language training. OPR: USD (P&R) FOC: June 2005
2.H. Establish “crash” or “survival” courses for deploying forces. Acquire or create off-the-shelf products that are rapidly available to forces. Develop tailored, modular, pre-deployment regional and language familiarization courses with a common format. Courses will support Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) requirements as well as other Combatant Command missions. OPR: Secretary of the Army* FOC: September 2007

2.I. Implement language and region familiarization training during the deployment cycle. Develop and provide regional and language familiarization training to all military personnel during the deployment cycle or during en-route training. OPR: Secretaries of the Military Departments FOC: June 2005

2.J. Establish a coherent, prioritized, and coordinated DoD multi-language technology research, development and acquisition policy and program. Develop DoD goals for development, acquisition and employment of automated language enablers. Determine if on-going and planned projects contribute to these DoD-wide goals. OPR: USD (AT&L) FOC: December 2005

2.K. Establish “reachback” capability for deployed forces; i.e. call-back to interpretation/translation centers. This capability would provide rapid interpretation and translation via telephone or computer network to deployed units. OPR: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff FOC: September 2006

2.L. Create courses for emerging language needs. Identify languages that are potentially significant to the US military. Task the DLIFLC to develop course curriculum for the emergent languages, as well as to maintain contacts for potential instructors. OPR: Secretary of the Army* FOC: September 2008

2.M. Create strategic strongholds of low-density language expertise. Identify and develop military and civilian personnel with expertise in less commonly taught languages to provide an on-call resource for crisis or contingency response. OPR: USD (P&R) FOC: September 2008


Current Situation: Language skills are insufficient to meet the requirements of the changed security environment. The technological revolution of the 1990's requires much greater language capability than the stereotyped activities of Cold War opponents. A

* As Executive Agent for DLIFLC
higher level of language skill and greater language capacity is needed to build the internal relationships required for coalition/multi-national operations, peacekeeping, and civil/military affairs.

Many language requirements exist across the Department that do not require this higher level of language skill. The DLIFLC curricula are largely built to produce signal intelligence specialists in resident courses. Personnel requiring language training can attend the resident, one-size-fits-all courses at DLIFLC or receive training through alternative language programs that are not necessarily oriented toward military language needs.

There is currently no validated requirement against which to measure the adequacy of current inventory.

**Desired Outcomes:**

- The Department understands the numbers of personnel and levels of proficiency and performance required for tasks involving 3/3/3 and below 3/3/3 language skills, and the DoD Components have established career paths and training plans to get the right people to the correct proficiency level.

- Programs are in place to train personnel to achieve ILR level 3 or higher, along with specialized professional skills, where required to support DoD specified tasks.

- Programs are in place to train personnel to achieve the appropriate ILR level (below 3) to support DoD language specified tasks.

**Required Actions:**

*Please note: All required actions are subject to requirements of law; e.g., The Privacy Act and non-discrimination provisions, and coordination across policy proponents.*

3.A. **Identify tasks and missions that will require 3/3/3 and determine the minimum number of personnel needed to provide the language services.** Based on planning guidance the DoD Components will identify each billet that should be filled by a language professional and the proficiency required for that billet. OPRs: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretaries of the Military Departments, Heads of other DoD Components employing language capability. FOC: September 2005

3.B. **Set a DoD goal of ILR proficiency level 3/3/3 for language professionals, and implement training and career management plans to achieve and sustain this level.** Meeting the 3/3/3 goal will increase the capabilities of the Department by having language professionals qualified to meet multiple language requirements. A combination
of foundational initial language training, advanced training, proper utilization assignments, effective command language program maintenance training and effective career management will be required to fully establish the Department’s 3/3/3 level language professional cadre. OPR: USD (P&R), Secretaries of the Military Departments, Heads of other DoD Components employing language capability FOC: September 2005

3.C. Identify and recognize the value of personnel achieving and maintaining the highest levels of proficiency in critical languages by paying a substantially increased FLPP (or civilian equivalent). Make FLPP more effective as an incentive to maintain and improve language capability by increasing FLPP. Address disparity between Active and Reserve Component FLPP. Establish DoD FLPP policy for legislative changes in FLPP entitlements and address related program and budget issues. Explore other incentives to encourage language maintenance and improvement. OPR: USD (P&R) FOC: December 2005

3.D. Maintain a cadre of service members with language capabilities for tasks require less than 3/3/3 proficiency. Identify tasks that require less than 3/3/3 proficiency, determine the languages, the ILR proficiency level, and densities required. Basic language skills are needed within many facets of the DoD mission. Based upon planning guidance, the DoD Components will identify billets that require language (language skills less than 3/3/3) and the proficiency required for that billet. A combination of foundational initial language training, effective command language program maintenance training, and effective career management will be required to maintain these personnel at the appropriate ILR level. OPRs: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretaries of the Military Departments, Heads of other DoD Components employing language capability FOC: September 2005

3.E. Conduct a study to analyze and evaluate the need for, impact of, and, if determined beneficial, recommendations for implementation of FLPP including extending implementation to those with proficiency at less than 2/2 level. The study will be comprehensive and include current and potentially beneficial policies, practices, and financial costs across DoD. Comparisons with private sector practices, current and developing, will be reviewed. The study will address the motivational and retention value of FLPP beyond anecdotal evidence to establish a business case on this practice for DoD. It will include civilian personnel. OPR: USD (P&R) FOC: August 2005

3.F. Refine personnel and mission database tracking procedures that will enable managers to monitor capabilities and program effectiveness. Until such time as the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) has replaced existing information systems, Component database procedures must provide an accurate picture
of the Department’s overall language capabilities and insight on training and career
management effectiveness for all military language personnel with language skill.
Likewise the DCPDS will fill that role for defense civilians. OPR: USD (P&R)
FOC: December 2005

Goal 4. Establish a process to track the accession, separation and promotion rates
of military personnel with language skills and Foreign Area Officers (FAOs).

Current Situation: Retention rates are lower among military personnel with language
skills in some Services, primarily due to poor linguist utilization. FAO jobs are viewed
as career ending in some Service officer communities.

Desired Outcomes:

♦ Military personnel with language skills and FAOs are developed and managed as
critical strategic assets.

♦ All Services have established professional career tracks for FAOs and promote FAOs
competitively.

♦ Departmental oversight ensures the effective tracking and management of these
strategic assets.

Required Actions:

Please note: All required actions are subject to requirements of law; e.g., The Privacy
Act and non-discrimination provisions, and coordination across policy proponents.

4.A. Publish a revised DoD Directive to oversee the Services FAO Programs.
Update the current DoD Directive 1315.17 to create a capability based planning process
for developing and managing FAOs based upon current and emerging requirements.
Increase or establish FAO program oversight functions of OSD and JCS.
OPR: USD (P&R) FOC: May 2005

4.B. Develop and sustain a personnel information system that maintains accurate
data on all DoD personnel skilled in foreign languages and regional area expertise.
Work closely with all concerned elements to ensure standardized data entry and
management procedures of Service language personnel information. OPR: USD (P&R)
FOC: September 2008
4.C. Establish metrics to monitor FAO accession, retentions, and promotion rates. Metrics will track FAO utilization and career progression to identify trends and examine impacts of alternative practices. OPR: USD (P&R) FOC: March 2006

4.D. Establish metrics to monitor performance of the DLP (to include utilization and management, accession, promotion, retention, and selected issues) and institute a process for regular reporting to the USD (P&R). This action will strengthen oversight of the management of FAO and military personnel with language skills in all Services. OPR: USD (P&R) FOC: March 2006

**Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center Transformation (DLIFLC)**

Upon closer review of these goals, the DFLSC determined that the transformation of the DLIFLC is a critical implied task for Defense Language Transformation and established outcomes for this task. Improvements will result in better-qualified language personnel upon graduation from DLIFLC. Results will also enable DLIFLC to more effectively provide language support beyond the Intelligence Community to other Defense Components.

**Desired Outcomes:**

- The DLIFLC graduates students at the highest ILR level possible from the basic courses, and continues distributed foreign language education throughout the Service members’ career.

- Language professionals attain level 3/3/3 as soon as possible in their career.

- The DLIFLC is able to respond rapidly to emerging language training requirements.

- DLIFLC provides tailored language courses to meet below 3/3/3 language requirements.

- The DLIFLC will identify and develop “study abroad” opportunities that expedite language acquisition for DoD military members and civilians and provide information to the Military Departments.

The Commandant and Chancellor of DLIFLC will formulate specific recommendations to facilitate these outcomes. The DFLSC will also oversee the implementation of these recommendations, monitor progress through performance measures, and report status of transformational efforts regularly to USD (P&R).
Goals: Offices Of Primary Responsibility And Dates For Full Operational Capability (FOC)

Goal 1. Create Foundational Language and Regional Area Expertise.

1.A. Establish a Language Office within USD (P&R).
OPR: USD(P&R) FOC: May 2005

OPR: USD(P&R) FOC: July 2005

1.C. Publish a DoD Instruction providing guidance for language program management.
OPR: USD(P&R) FOC: June 2006

1.D. Ensure doctrine, policies, and planning guidance reflect the need for language requirements in operational, contingency, and stabilization planning.
OPR: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretaries of the Military Departments FOC: March 2006

1.E. Require COCOMs to identify linguistic and translator requirements as part of their contingency and deliberate planning processes for operations and plans.
OPR: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff FOC: September 2005

1.F. Build a capabilities-based language requirement determination process.
OPR: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, USD(P) FOC: March 2006

1.G. Publish a “strategic language list” annually.
OPR: USD(P&R), USD(P) FOC: June 2005

1.H. Develop a language readiness index.
OPR: USD(P&R) FOC: September 2005

1.I. Standardize language and regional identification codes for use across the DoD.
OPR: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff FOC: September 2005

1.J. Conduct a one-time self-report screening of all military and civilian personnel for language skills.
OPR: Secretaries of the Military Departments FOC: December 2005

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1.K. Establish guidelines and plans for recruiting from heritage and US populace with language capabilities.  
OPR: USD(P&R); Secretaries of the Military Departments  FOC: June 2005

1.L. Support implementation of the National Flagship Language Initiative (NFLI).  
OPR: USD(P&R)  FOC: On-going

1.M. Develop a recruiting plan for officers and civilians with foreign language skills in universities.  
OPR: USD(P&R)  FOC: November 2005

1.N. Revise current practices employed during the civilian job application process to facilitate development of a civilian language pool.  
OPR: USD(P&R)  FOC: September 2005

1.O. Improve the testing system across the DLP.  
OPR: Secretary of the Army as EA of DLIFLC  FOC: 2007

1.P. Ensure incorporation of regional area content in language training, professional military education and development, and pre-deployment training.  
OPR: Secretaries of the Military Departments  FOC: March 2006

1.Q. Exploit “study abroad” opportunities to facilitate language acquisition.  
OPR: Secretaries of the Military Departments  FOC: March 2006

1.R. Establish the requirement that junior officers complete language training.  
Make available one-year assignments for junior officers to serve with a foreign military or national constabulary/para-military force and reward such service via advancement.  
OPR: OSD (P&R)  FOC: April 2005

1.S. Make foreign language ability a criterion for general officer/flag officer advancement.  
OPR: OSD (P&R); Secretaries of Military Departments  FOC: April 2005

1.T. Develop a plan to engage an interagency effort to maximize use of resources.  
OPR: USD(P&R)  FOC: On-going

Goal 2: Create the capacity to surge.

2.A. Expedite the staffing and publication of a language and regional expertise operational planning tool.  
OPR: USD(P&R), Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  FOC: June 2005
2.B. Improve (centralize and standardize) contract language support.
OPR: Secretary of the Army               FOC: December 2005

2.C. Track retirees and separatees for recall or voluntary return.
OPR: USD(P&R)                            FOC: September 2005

2.D. Study the need for enhancing civilian language and regional expertise in the workforce.
OPR: USD(P&R)                            FOC: December 2005

2.E. Study the Army’s Pilot 09L Individual Ready Reserve program for possible DoD-wide implementation.
OPR: USD(P&R)                            FOC: December 2005

2.F. Support a pilot to implement a Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps (CLRC).
OPR: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (NDU) FOC: June 2007

2.G. Develop and evaluate the concept for a Joint Service Language Corps (JSLC).
OPR: USD(P&R)                            FOC: June 2005

2.H. Establish “crash” or “survival” courses for deploying forces.
OPR: Secretary of the Army               FOC: September 2007

2.I. Implement language and region familiarization training during the deployment cycle.
OPR: Secretaries of the Military Departments FOC: June 2005

2.J. Establish a coherent, prioritized, and coordinated DoD multi-language technology research, development and acquisition policy and program.
OPR: USD(AT&L)                           FOC: December 2005

2.K. Establish “reachback” capability for deployed forces, i.e. call-back to interpretation/translation centers.
OPR: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff     FOC: September 2006

2.L. Create courses for emerging language needs.
OPR: Secretary of the Army               FOC: September 2008

2.M. Create strategic strongholds of low-density language expertise.
OPR: USD(P&R)                            FOC: September 2008

3.A. Identify tasks and missions that will require 3/3/3 and determine the minimum number of personnel needed to provide the language services.
OPR: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretaries of the Military Departments, Directors of Defense Agencies employing language capability
FOC: September 2005

3.B. Set a DoD goal of ILR proficiency level 3/3/3 for language professionals, and implement training and career management plans to achieve and sustain this level.
OPR: USD(P&R), Secretaries of the Military Departments, Directors of Defense Agencies employing language capability
FOC: September 2005

3.C. Identify and recognize the value of personnel achieving and maintaining the highest levels of proficiency in critical languages by paying a substantially increased FLPP.
OPR: USD(P&R)
FOC: December 2005

3.D. Maintain a cadre of service members with language capabilities for tasks that require less than 3/3/3 proficiency. Identify tasks that require less than 3/3/3 proficiency, determine the languages, the ILR proficiency level, and densities required.
OPR: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretaries of the Military Departments, Directors of Defense Agencies employing language capability
FOC: September 2005

3.E. Conduct a study to analyze and evaluate the need for, impact of, and, if determined beneficial, recommendations for implementation of FLPP, including extending implementation to those with proficiency at less than 2/2 level.
OPR: USD(P&R)
FOC: August 2005

3.F. Refine personnel and mission database tracking procedures that will enable managers to monitor capabilities and program effectiveness.
OPR: USD (P&R)
FOC: December 2005
Goal 4. Establish a process to track the accession, separation and promotion rates of language professionals and Foreign Area Officers (FAOs).

4.A. Publish a revised DoD Directive to oversee the Services FAO Programs.
OPR: USD(P&R)  FOC: May 2005

4.B. Develop and sustain a personnel information system that maintains accurate data on all DoD personnel skilled in foreign languages and regional area expertise.
OPR: USD(P&R)  FOC: September 2008

4.C. Establish metrics to monitor FAO accession, retentions, and promotion rates.
OPR: USD(P&R)  FOC: March 2005

4.D. Establish metrics to monitor performance of the DLP (to include utilization and management, accession, promotion, retention, and selected issues) and institute a process for regular reporting to the USD (P&R).
OPR: USD(P&R)  FOC: March 2006
I. Introduction

Given the changes in the strategic landscape since 9/11, the myriad post-Cold War cultures we face, and the unique maritime security challenges of the 21st Century, success in achieving the nation’s Maritime Strategy depends in large part on our ability to communicate with and comprehend potential adversaries, enduring allies, and emerging partner nations. As the lessons of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom attest, communication and comprehension are enabled through awareness of foreign cultures, regional expertise, and skill in foreign languages. Development and improvement of Navy’s competencies in these critical capabilities will facilitate the quality of our foreign interactions and enable cooperative and collaborative relationships. They are essential elements in the Navy’s engagement in every phase of war, but paramount to the Navy’s ability to shape and influence blue, brown and green water security environments in all Phase 0 operations.

"The fleet is more than just combat capability. The fleet has really always had an almost diplomatic capability."

The Honorable Donald C. Winter, Secretary of the Navy.

Purpose

The Navy Language Skills, Regional Expertise and Cultural Awareness (LREC) Strategy acknowledges the importance of these enablers and provides overarching guidance for the development, alignment, management and transformation of LREC capability and capacity in the force. Aligned with the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, Department of the Navy Objectives for FY 2008 and Beyond, Chief of Naval Operations Guidance, the Navy Strategic Plan, the Naval Operations Concept 2006, and the Navy Strategy for Our People, it links indirectly to higher-level national, defense and military strategies, and tailors the goals and objectives of the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap to the Navy mission. Figure 1 illustrates these relationships.

In effect a supporting tier within the family of Navy strategies, the Navy LREC Strategy makes the following assumptions:

- Operations with international partners will increase
- LREC demand signals will evolve with Navy’s Maritime Strategy
• The mobility, variety, range and unpredictability of maritime operations complicates the definition, development and sustainment of LREC requirements
• Cultural awareness and regional knowledge transcend foreign language skill in terms of total force priorities
• LREC capabilities are highly perishable and require sustainment to be effective
• LREC capability development/sustainment demands a time/training investment
• Continuously constrained budgets will impact LREC capacity
• Increasingly diverse population can deliver some LREC capability

Figure 1: Relationship to Higher Level Strategies

Consistent with the *Navy Strategic Plan*, the LREC Strategy provides a framework for future examination and decisions that will lead to the development, funding, and delivery of quality capability in support of the CNO’s vision for the Navy. It allows the Navy to (1) unify disparate LREC efforts and align LREC capabilities consistent with extant and future strategic landscapes; (2) optimize the allocation of limited resources and integrate LREC into Navy’s Planning, Programming and Budgeting Execution (PPBE) process; and (3) guide LREC investment decisions in support of POM-10 and across the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP).
Determining the right mix of LREC competencies relative to the constantly changing strategic landscape and finding the right balance of language and cultural skill for myriad international partners or adversaries the Navy potentially faces is a considerable challenge. Moreover, building the right investment portfolio with which to achieve and sustain these skills within the force necessitates continuous examination at practically all levels within the chain of command. Together with the Joint Staff’s “Language and Regional Expertise Planning” tool, this LREC Strategy will enable a more accurate definition of LREC requirements, a thorough assessment of gaps in capability, and focused training and education to build and maintain the competencies and expertise Navy requires. When combined with the Navy’s Strategic Language List, this strategy and the Joint Staff tool allow us to size and shape LREC with the right capacities, and in the right languages and cultures to meet fleet demand.

*What’s changed? The Case for Greater LREC in Navy*

In the bi-polar world of the Cold War, the nation and the Navy concentrated most of its resources on the Soviet Union and its partner nations. When the Soviet Bloc disintegrated in the 1990s, the Navy’s LREC capability gradually began to transition to a multi-polar international environment, adjusting to regional and transnational powers as they manifested themselves. As part of our 21st Century engagement strategy, we are actively developing relationships with new powers emerging in this environment, leveraging opportunities through Global Maritime Partnerships and Global Fleet Stations to build mutual cooperation and trust.

> “Implement Building Partner Capacity initiatives (including cultural awareness/language capabilities). Build support for the new Maritime Strategy to include national and international partnerships as elements of Global Maritime Partnerships. Increase and deploy Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief capacities.” DoN Objectives for FY 2008 and Beyond, October 2007

The number and variety of cultures and foreign languages the Navy faces in this new environment far and away exceeds the level faced in the Cold War. Strategic, operational and tactical success will depend to some degree on practical skill in less commonly taught languages. It will also require an awareness of unfamiliar regional

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1. CICSI 3126.01, Language and Regional Expertise Planning, 23 Jan 06
2. The Navy Strategic Language List (NSLL) complements the DoD Strategic Language List and prioritizes those foreign languages considered critical to Navy’s mission. Both the DoD and Navy lists are used to shape language capability within the force through recruitment, training, education and incentivization. The FY-07 Navy Strategic Language List (NSLL) was published with OPNAVNOTE 5300 of 5 March 2007. The FY-08 NSLL is in staffing.
cultures, many of which were long suppressed by foreign domination, and some of which are resistant to the 21st Century global system. Navy LREC competencies will be indispensable to penetrating cultural barriers, and understanding unfamiliar, ambiguous, and seemingly irrational behaviors. Considering the cultural and linguistic diversity of this new security environment, we will require comparably diverse LREC capabilities.

"Globalization is shaping human migration patterns, health, education, culture, and the calculus of conflict. Conflicts are increasingly characterized by a hybrid blend of traditional and irregular tactics... Weak or corrupt governments, growing dissatisfaction among the disenfranchised, religious extremism, ethnic nationalism and changing demographics—often spurred on by the uneven and sometimes unwelcome advances of globalization—exacerbate tensions and are contributors to conflict.” Navy Strategic Plan (POM-10), September 2007

Indeed, the issue of LREC competency transcends Navy’s needs and is recognized as a national priority. On 5 January 2006, the President formally introduced the National Security Language Initiative, which aims to dramatically increase the number of Americans learning critical foreign languages to include Arabic, Chinese, Hindi, Farsi and others. Sponsored by the Defense, State and Education Departments, and the Director of National Intelligence, the initiative’s three broad goals include:

- Expand the number of Americans mastering critical languages, starting at an earlier age
- Increase the number of advanced-level speakers of foreign languages with an emphasis on critical languages
- Increase the number of foreign language teachers as well as the resources they need

As the President asserted in his announcement of the initiative, educated Americans will eventually speak a second language. Representative of the American population, Navy members will in many cases have facility with one or more foreign languages.

Within the Department of Defense (DoD), the principal driver for LREC modernization is the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap, which establishes four major goals:

- Create foundational language and cultural expertise in the officer, civilian and enlisted ranks for both Active and Reserve Components
- Create the capacity to surge language and cultural resources beyond these foundational and in-house capabilities
- Establish a cadre of language specialists with a level 3/3/3 (listening/reading/speaking) ability and address language requirements below the 3/3/3 level.
• Establish a process to track the accession, separation and promotion rates of language professionals and Foreign Area Officers (FAO)

To achieve these goals across DoD, the Roadmap assigned 43 separate implementing tasks to the Military Departments, DoD Agencies and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The focus, priorities, objectives and tasks contained within this LREC Strategy are fully aligned with and complementary of the Roadmap.

“Trust and cooperation cannot be surged. Expanded cooperative relationships will contribute to the security and stability of the maritime domain for the benefit of all ... A key to fostering such relationships is development of sufficient cultural, historical and linguistic expertise among our Sailors...to nurture effective interaction with diverse international partners.” Navy Strategic Plan (POM-10), September 2007

The Need for a Navy LREC Strategy

Experience in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom has shown that LREC capabilities are essential for successful maritime security cooperation, maritime domain awareness, humanitarian efforts, and shaping and stability operations. They are critical to Navy expeditionary operations, civil/military affairs, maritime interdiction operations, intelligence, information warfare, criminal investigations, interrogations, debriefings and general translation. They are rapidly becoming part of our warrior ethos and remain a key element in the operational art of naval warfare.

“We are no longer singularly focused on weapons delivery. In the last decade we have seen an increase in the number and positive impact of Navy humanitarian missions. We cannot be defined by a single mission or role. We must be agile, flexible and ready – able to provide naval influence anytime, anywhere.” Strategy for Our People 2007

Given the Navy’s two century tradition of overseas contact and connection, as well as our role as the nation’s first responder, it is appropriate that we build and maintain an LREC capability consistent with the global engagement responsibilities prescribed in the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower and the Naval Operations Concept 2006. A coherent strategy to achieve this capability is needed. This document follows Navy Strategic Plan guidance to “Implement the LREC Strategy that facilitates and
enables the transformation and development of Navy’s LREC capability/capacity for the 21st century international security environment."

II. Vision

The vision and end-state we seek is:

- Sufficient LREC capacity that meets Navy’s known mission needs, with appropriate levels of expertise, and able to surge for emergent requirements:
  - A total force that appreciates and respects cultural differences, and recognizes the risks and consequences of inappropriate, even if unintended, behavior in foreign interactions.
  - A cadre of career language professionals (i.e., FAOs and cryptologic language analysts) whose primary functions require foreign language skill and regional expertise.
  - Other language-skilled Sailors and civilians with sufficient proficiency to interact with foreign nationals at the working level.
  - A reserve capacity of organic foreign language skill and cultural expertise that can be called upon for contingencies

- LREC capabilities aligned with operational requirements to support Joint and Navy missions utilizing the total force – active, reserve, civilian and contractor – and enabling Navy’s ability to shape and influence the maritime security environment
- Given the time and expense necessary to achieve and sustain the capability, agile, responsive and cost-effective LREC plans and policies that deliver results at best value while managing risk
- LREC development capability that maximizes existing education and training infrastructure, embraces new training opportunities, leverages the heritage and ethnic diversity of the Navy, and rewards linguistic proficiency.

"The vast majority of the world’s population lives within a few hundred miles of the oceans. Social instability in increasingly crowded cities, many of which exist in already unstable parts of the world, has the potential to create significant disruptions.” Navy Strategic Plan (POM-10), September 2007

III. Desired Effects

Applying the LREC Strategy to existing Navy planning processes will achieve the aforementioned vision and end-state. It will enable the Navy’s engagement strategy by fostering collaborative relationships with enduring and emerging regional partners. It
will support the Navy’s prosecution of the GWOT in independent, combined and joint operations. The capability will be delivered by a competency-based workforce comprised of FAOs, cryptologic language analysts, and Sailors, officers and civilians with skill in foreign languages and knowledge of overseas cultures and regions. Executing the LREC strategy will add a core dimension to the art of naval warfare that can only reinforce our operational superiority in maritime, littoral, riverine and shore-based environments.

IV. Mission

To realize this vision and desired effects, the Navy will organize, recruit, train, manage, and deliver LREC capabilities consistent with CNO’s Guidance, the Navy Strategic Plan and the Navy Strategy for Our People. To accomplish this mission, we will deliver LREC:

- With a development process that leverages legacy and emerging capabilities, but optimizes existing MPT&E infrastructure
- With the right capacity, competency and proficiency
- That is capabilities and effects-based, aligned with, and adaptable to, operational need as defined, forecast and validated by the warfighter
- That is managed, tracked and detailed to the right place and time to facilitate coalition, combined, Joint and Navy missions
- That is continually assessed relative to operational readiness and relevance, and shaped as needed to optimize its capability/capacity.

V. Priorities and Objectives

The following priorities and objectives are designed to achieve the LREC vision and mission:

1. Align and consolidate the organization, policies and processes associated with LREC under the management of the Navy’s Senior Language Authority (SLA) (CNO N13) to efficiently program, coordinate, and deliver the capability.

2. Ascertain the scope, depth and breadth of LREC capability and capacity within the total force and implement processes to monitor readiness, measure proficiency, and align to Fleet requirements.
3. Accurately define the Navy’s LREC requirements and articulate specific competencies (i.e., translator, interpreter, Foreign Area Officer), degrees of expertise, and capacities needed by the force.

4. Identify LREC capability and capacity shortfalls in the force and develop a plan to fill the gaps, either by building capability or realigning existing capacity.

5. Expand cultural awareness in the force by integrating regional content and, as appropriate, language familiarization in Navy Professional Military Education (NPME), pre-/mid-deployment training, and port visit orientation.

6. Maximize the contributions of language professionals and language-enabled Sailors through increased training opportunities and appropriate incentives.

7. Build capability and capacity by implementing language-related accession and heritage-community recruiting goals, increasing undergraduate LREC study where appropriate, and directly training selected post-accession officers as appropriate.

8. Fully implement Navy’s FAO Program and optimize the Personnel Exchange Program (PEP) consistent with the expanding relationships with emerging partners.

9. Coordinate these objectives with the Defense Language Office, the Joint Staff, other Services, DoD Agencies, and the Combatant Commanders, as appropriate, to avoid duplication of effort and promote joint and combined operations.

“We strengthen and cultivate relationships. Our Navy interacts with many people and organizations on a local, national and international level. We will strengthen our partnerships and engage future partners to build steadfast relationships that advance global maritime security and our common national interests.” CNO Guidance for 2008

U.S Navy Photo
VI. Tasking

To achieve these priorities and objectives, the lead agent (first listed after each task) assigned in the following items will execute, coordinate and facilitate the completion of the tasks. Where indicated, tasks are consistent with and aligned to action required by the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap.

1. Align and consolidate the organization, policies and processes associated with LREC under the management of the Navy’s SLA to efficiently program, coordinate and execute the capability:

   a. Organize Navy program management to include LREC, FAO, CTI, and PEP personnel policies. Revise corresponding Navy instructions. (N13, N3IO, N2C, N5SP) (Roadmap Tasks 1.A, 1.B and 1.C)

   b. Refresh Navy doctrine, policies, and planning guidance to reflect the need for LREC in operational, contingency and stabilization planning. (N13, N11, N2, N3IO, N5SP, FFC, NWDC) (Roadmap Task 1.D)

   c. Develop tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) to facilitate the proper application of LREC capabilities in the new international security environment. (FFC, NWDC) (Roadmap Task 1.D)

2. Ascertain the scope, depth and breadth of LREC capability and capacity within the total force and implement processes to monitor readiness, measure proficiency, align to fleet requirements, and forecast demand:

   a. Discern and document incoming language capability through screening at accession points. Include officers, enlisted and civilians. (N13, N11, N12, NETC, NSTC, USNA) (Roadmap Task 1.J)

   b. Refine personnel database systems (Active, Reserve and Civilian) and requirements to enable force managers to monitor language capabilities, readiness, and program effectiveness. (N13, N095, N11) (Roadmap Task 3.F)

   c. Implement a language readiness index to measure capabilities relative to Navy’s roles and missions. Identify gaps in readiness and facilitate corrective action. (N13, N11) (Roadmap Task 1.H)

   d. Require Fleet, Navy Components, and major Budget Submitting Offices (BSO) to identify LREC capabilities necessary for day-to-day operations as well as in deliberate and contingency planning processes. (N13, N11, FFC, BSOS) (Roadmap Task 1.E)
(1) Identify tasks and missions that will require LREC, define the proficiency level, the specific function (e.g., voice analyst, interpreter, translator, FAO, PEP), and determine the number of personnel required to provide the services. (N13, N11, N3IO, N5SP, N2, FFC)

(2) Reconcile language-coded billets accordingly. (N13, N11)

(3) Define required competencies, knowledge, skills and abilities (KSA) for career linguists and regional experts within the total force. (N13, N11, N3IO, N5SP)

e. Identify, define and institutionalize LREC-related Mission Essential Tasks (MET) with which to facilitate fleet training standardization and readiness reporting. (FFC, NETC, NPDC, N13)

f. Improve language testing across Navy. Make DLAB more accessible for officer candidates and potential recruits who meet CTI ASVAB requirements. Aggressively implement and expand the DLPT system. (N13, N12) (Roadmap Task 1.0)

3. Deliver LREC capability to the fleet, align capability/capacity as appropriate to Navy component command needs, and accelerate development of capability for Navy expeditionary missions:

a. Fully develop the Center for Information Dominance’s Center for Language, Regional Expertise and Culture (CLREC). The Center will leverage existing foreign language, culture and area studies instruction, as well as training tools, technologies and methodologies, to facilitate professional development of FAO, intelligence, information warfare, and cryptologic personnel. Additionally, CLREC will develop practical, Navy-wide, cross-cultural skills needed to enhance relationships with emerging partners. (NETC, NPDC, N13)
b. Incorporate LREC in pre-deployment and in-deployment training. (FFC, NETC, CLREC, N12, N13) (Roadmap Tasks 1.P and 2.I)

c. Integrate regional and cultural content into Navy PME. (NWC, NETC, N12, N13) (Roadmap Task 1.P)

d. Execute Navy’s FAO Implementation Plan. (N13, N5SP)

e. Execute Navy’s CTI 2010 Implementation Plan (N2C, N3IO, N13)

f. Align PEP with component commander regional engagement strategies to better leverage opportunities with emerging partner nations. (N5SP, N13)

g. Fully fund the Naval Postgraduate School’s (NPS) Regional Security Education Program (RSEP). (N13, NPS) (Roadmap Tasks 1.P and 2.I)

h. Beyond RSEP, leverage the specialized regional/cultural education resources of NPS, both resident and Distributive Learning, to further enable 21st Century Navy warfighting capabilities. (N13, N12, NPS) (Roadmap Tasks 1.P and 2.I)

i. Expand officer participation in Regional Study Masters Degree resident programs at NPS. (NPC, N13, NPS) (Roadmap Task 1.P)

4. Maximize the contributions of foreign language professionals and language-enabled Sailors and Civilians through training opportunities and appropriate incentives:

a. Exploit “study abroad” opportunities to facilitate LREC acquisition. As feasible and appropriate, expand war colleges (including foreign), Olmsted Foundation opportunities; increase overseas study for USNA/NROTC (N13, N12, N11, USNA, NETC, NSTC) (Roadmap Task 1.Q)

b. Implement and sustain Foreign Language Proficiency Bonus (FLPB) incentives consistent with DoD policies. (N13, N11) (Roadmap Task 3.C)

5. Build LREC capability and capacity for the future by implementing language-related accession and recruiting goals, increasing undergraduate LREC study where appropriate, and directly training selected post-accession officers:

a. Develop, maintain and publish the Navy Strategic Language List (NSLL) as a tool to shape force capability. (N13) (Roadmap Tasks 1.G and 2.M)

b. Recruit from heritage and immigrant communities in the U.S. to enhance force LREC capability. (CNRC, N13, N11, NPC) (Roadmap Task 1.K)
c. Depending on articulated requirements, build and maintain non-FAO officer LREC expertise:

(1) Establish a base of non-FAO language-skilled officers, trained to the 2/2 level in strategic languages. (N13, NETC, NPC)

(2) Consistent with congressional authorizations and the Navy’s undergraduate education priorities, increase overseas immersion and semester exchange opportunities for USNA and NROTC as funding permits. (N13)

d. Study LREC enhancement for civilians in the Navy workforce, consistent with the Total Force concept. (N13, N11) (Roadmap Task 2.D)

e. Examine the feasibility of a general linguist rating with separate career tracks for cryptology/information warfare, intelligence, and regional sub-specialists (e.g., enlisted Foreign Area Specialists). (N13, N31O, N2C, N5SP)

f. Identify requirements and use multi-language and machine language technology capabilities, and exploit related research, development and acquisition efforts where appropriate. (N13, N6F, N86, FFC) (Roadmap Task 2.J)

"We must seek to understand, and embrace when possible, the strategic objectives of our partners. Navy will continue to conduct shaping initiatives such as security assistance, security cooperation, proactive humanitarian assistance and crisis response while promoting Global Maritime Partnerships, Maritime Domain Awareness and Global Fleet Stations to increase trust, confidence and capabilities of our maritime partners."  Navy Strategic Plan (POM-10), September 2007
VII. Conclusion

Accommodating Navy’s global maritime security commitments and executing the Navy Strategic Plan requires a concentrated and comprehensive framework with which to transform our LREC capabilities. The Navy LREC Strategy provides that framework and constitutes the baseline and starting point for future examination and decisions. It facilitates the coordination and organization of disparate LREC efforts and aligns LREC capabilities consistent with the current and future strategic landscape. It optimizes the allocation of limited resources, integrates LREC more firmly into Navy’s PPBE process, and guides investment decisions in support of POM-10 and across the FYDP. While meant to be enduring, changes in the strategic landscape will necessitate adjustments to the strategy. Therefore, environmental monitoring will be required to ensure it remains relevant between PPBE process-based updates.

J/C. HARVEY, JR.
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
(Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education)

U.S. Navy Photo
## APPENDIX F: NSLI FUNDING, BY AGENCY

<table>
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<th>Activity</th>
<th>FY07 Final Appropriations</th>
<th>FY07 Budget Request</th>
<th>FY08 Final Appropriations</th>
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<td><strong>$6.5</strong></td>
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**National Security Language Initiative**
ABOUT THE COVER: AN ELDER’S EXPLANATION

An elderly Iraqi man explains his community’s situation to U.S. Army soldiers in the city of Abu T-Shir, Iraq, Oct. 16, 2008. The soldiers are assigned to the 7th Battalion, 10th Cavalry Regiment and are helping the local community take back control of their streets.

U.S. Navy photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Todd Frantom.