
Staffing for Cyberspace Operations


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Building a Cyber Mission Force (CMF) capable of carrying out cyberspace operations is currently a major force planning effort in the Department of Defense (DoD). Determining the appropriate total force mix, defined as the choice between military, government civilian, and contractor performance of DoD activities, is a key component in this planning effort. **The Department initially estimated the CMF would require approximately 80 percent military staffing, despite the fact that the positions are largely office jobs performed in fixed facilities located in the United States that would not involve deployment.**

The attainment of a well-reasoned total force mix is critically important; among other things, the "wrong" total force mix can put the mission at risk or result in inefficiencies that consume scarce defense resources. Accordingly, the Office of the Secretary of Defense asked IDA to compute the potential savings if generally less expensive government civilians were substituted for military personnel where operationally feasible. IDA reviewed every CMF billet to determine whether it required a military performer. A key element of IDA's analysis was development of the following criteria to determine who is a direct participant in cyber hostilities:



- There must be a **belligerent nexus**, an intent to cause harm.
- Such harm must be the result of **direct causation** from a specific act. Developing software for possible cyber missions does not constitute direct causation.



Applying these criteria, **IDA derived an alternative** staffing plan for the CMF that increased the fraction of government civilian personnel to almost half of the relevant staff.

To understand the budgetary implications of the various force mixes, IDA calculated the full cost of manpower for each Cyber Team using the total force mix employed by the Services and the IDA alternative force mix. The costing was performed in accordance with guidance and cost elements laid out in DoD Instruction 7041.04. The analysis

indicated that **the IDA staffing plan could save approximately 15 percent of the manpower cost or \$130 million in manpower annually**. Approximately 95 percent of the manpower savings in the alternative staffing plan came from replacing more expensive officers, enlisted personnel, and contractors with less expensive government civilian employees.

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